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# Threats to National Security—I

LT GENERAL S K SINHA PVSM (RETD)

A Nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war. National security implies the ability of a Nation to preserve and protect its chosen way of life. The way of life we have chosen for ourselves is fundamentally different from that chosen by two of our powerful neighbours, with whom we have had military clashes in the recent past and with whom we continue to have unresolved territorial disputes. One believes in theocracy and religious fundamentalism as against secularism chosen by us, and the other has established the dictatorship of the party as against our faith in the freedom of the individual. We also have a basically different outlook from the two Super Powers. They are both the lynch pins of military alliances and for us, non-alignment has been an article of faith. These differences from our neighbours and the Super Powers inevitably affect our threat perceptions, which stem from both external and internal dangers.

## EXTERNAL THREATS

The present international system is essentially based on the understanding reached between the victorious Allied Powers at Yalta in 1945. It caters for a hierarchical system with the five veto-wielding powers enjoying a higher status. During the next 20 years, all the veto-wielding powers acquired nuclear weapons which are today the symbols of prestige and status. There is an attempt to preserve this status quo through a non-proliferation treaty which provides for unlimited proliferation by them and prohibits proliferation by others.

The two Super Powers have each built an awesome nuclear stockpile with which they can annihilate each other many times over and in the process also destroy the whole world. So far, direct

military confrontation between the Super Powers has been avoided because of the realisation that it would lead to mutual assured destruction. The balance of terror between them has provided a measure of security to the world. It has discouraged them from launching direct military attack against any country but it does not preclude their indulging in hegemonism, interventionism or proxy wars. We need to view the awesome array of military power in the Indian Ocean in this light and not as a modern version of the Eighteenth Century scenario, when the European maritime build up in these waters, led to the enslavement of Asia. Today, the threat to the littoral states of the Indian Ocean is primarily in terms of interventionism and proxy wars.

### U S A

The USA has been following a policy of containment of the USSR. The NATO alliance in Europe is designed to prevent Soviet ingress towards the West. The developing relations with China virtually provide the USA with an Eastern NATO. The gap in the ring from Turkey to Pakistan is sought to be covered by the military build up in the Indian Ocean. The loss of Iran as an ally, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the need to protect the oil routes in the Gulf, provide additional impetus for this build up. The first cold war between the Super Powers was largely confined to Europe. The second cold war is generally centred round the Indian Ocean. A hot war in this region may save Europe from devastation. US relations with Pakistan have to be viewed in the light of these considerations.

India's relations with the USA have had a chequered history. In the Roosevelt era, the US earned our gratitude for its support for our Independence. After 1947, US provided substantial economic aid and there was euphoria for the great experiment in democracy being carried out in India. Despite shared values, American attitude towards India soured as a result of a host of differences like India refusing to line up behind US leadership, Indian response to US involvement in Korea and Viet Nam, Indian reaction to the interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Granada, Indian stand on the non-proliferation treaty, and Indian sensitivity to US military presence in the Indian Ocean and to the rearming of Pakistan.

The US has set up a Central Command with headquarters at Florida and an advance base at Diego Garcia. A rapid deployment force (RDF) of 400,000 troops has been assigned to this Command for operations in South-West Asia. Some thirty US warships including an aircraft carrier group are operating in the Indian Ocean. Unlike 1971 US military response to any situation in this region can be instantaneous. There would be no need to despatch an aircraft carrier from the Pacific.

Sound defence strategy demands that we plan on the basis of the capabilities and not the intentions of our neighbours. With its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the US has become our neighbour. It is obviously much beyond our capability to develop a matching response to US military power but mercifully there is no requirement to do so. We have only to guard against interventionism or a proxy war. In specific terms, this implies our ability to deal with a US supported aggression by Pakistan or US intervention like landing of marines on our coasts or on our island territories. The latter emphasises the need to enhance the capability of our Navy and the need to ensure adequate military presence on our island territories to prevent a Falkland type of operations.

#### USSR

USSR is understandably apprehensive of its soft underbelly in the South. Missiles launched from the Indian Ocean can hit strategic targets on the Russian mainland. It is also sensitive to the US containment ring around its territory. The ring extending from Western Europe to China and Japan has gaps in Iran, Afghanistan, India and Viet Nam. Herein lies Russian motivation in physically dominating countries like Afghanistan or maintaining close friendly ties with India and Viet Nam.

Indo-Soviet relations started on a hesitant note. Soviet commitment to Lenin's forecast of bringing about international communism through Shanghai and Calcutta was viewed with great suspicion in India. However, with the dawn of the Khrushchev era and the change in Russian foreign policy, Indo-Soviet relationship underwent a sea change. The USSR has become a constant and a reliable friend of India on issues like Kashmir, Bangladesh war, development of heavy industries and so on.



Notwithstanding our friendly relations with the USSR, we cannot ignore Soviet military presence of some 30 to 36 warships in the Indian Ocean. In a changed scenario of mutual relations, the USSR may resort to interventionism or proxy war just as much as the USA. However, for the foreseeable future the threat from the USSR is not so much of interventionism as of our getting too close to them and thereby ceasing to remain an independent decision-making centre. Herein lies the importance of our developing indigenous weapons and diversifying our sources of weapon supply.

#### CHINA

In China, Mao lies dead and forgotten in his masoleum at Beijing and with him a lot of Maoist ideas have got buried. However, the policy of collusion with USA continues to thrive and China has become the Eastern NATO. The declared aim of China is to attain great power status. To achieve their aim the Chinese have launched the programme of four modernisations of agriculture, industry, technology and the military. To effect these modernisations, China needs an era of peace as also economic, technological and military assistance from the advanced countries.

China is in illegal possession of a large area of Indian territory and has laid claims to more Indian territory. This border dispute has remained unresolved. She does not recognise Sikkim's merger with India or our special relations with Bhutan. She had been helping Naga and Mizo insurgents. She has also been siding with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and has recently constructed the Karakoram Highway. This road has little commercial value. It has strengthened Chinese interventionist capability in the region. A sino-US-Pak alliance suits Chinese interests. It can help in preventing India, the only possible rival centre of power, from attaining a dominant position in South Asia.

While assessing Chinese military capability against us, we do not have to take into account the capability of the entire Chinese Armed Forces, but the forces that can be deployed across the Himalayas after catering for adequate defence of the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Viet Nam borders. It is true that with the completion of the Gormo-Lhasa oil pipeline and the likely early completion of the Sining-Lhasa railway line, China's logistic capability to maintain force in Tibet

will increase considerably. The present seven division force level in this region can be raised to thirty divisions for a short war. However, the difficulties of conducting large scale trans-Himalayan operations should not be minimised and today the Indian Armed Forces are not in the same position as in 1962. In terms of military equipment, as assessed by independent analysts, the Indian Army enjoys a qualitative edge. Moreover, the Chinese would not have forgotten the lessons of their punitive operation against Viet Nam. According to a recent Pentagon study, the Chinese need 50 billion dollars and a period of 10 years to modernise their forces. It is unlikely that in the short term, the Chinese would attempt a military invasion of India. They are, however, likely to give collusive support to Pakistan as in 1965 and 1971 and they may recommence aiding insurgents in Eastern India.

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# Nation Building\*

BRIG S S CHANDEL SC, VSM

## INTRODUCTION

**D**EVELOPING nations such as India face a dilemma in the deployment of their resources. How much to spend on development which includes food, agriculture, industry, mining, exploration, transportation, communications, energy, education, medicare, welfare and so on. At the nascent stage of their independence they are also threatened by external forces which seek to influence both their polity as well as policies for their own ends. Fissiparous and disruptionist forces tend to pull a new nation apart. To contain both these threats a developing nation has to raise and maintain adequate Armed Forces—adequate both in terms of equipment and manpower. Both these cost money which must obviously come from the same kitty. More so in the modern age as two additional complexities have arisen. Equipment has become exorbitantly costly. A modern tank costs 1.25 crores, a TOW missile Rs 75000/- a Jaguar sixteen crores; a Leander class Frigate Rs 50 crores, a 155 mm gun Rs 20 lakhs, an attack helicopter Rs 3-4 crores. Also a soldier employed on a permanent basis may cost approximately 3 lakhs (taking into account his pay, allowances, travelling, housing, medicare welfare and pension).

When a nation is economically hard pressed for resources like India is, it may begin to wonder whether it can use the abundant resources and disciplined manpower of the Army (Military) for more gainful employment in peacetime. The militaryman protests putting forward the arguments of possible threats, the time needed for training, the hardship that he *alone* faces and the need to remain eternally vigilant. Like any executive he is likely to inflate his threats and requirements. In a situation like India's where most political

\*This article has won the silver medal prize in the COAS Essay Competition in 1986-87.

leaders are military innocents and where the collective national will does not find itself equal to facing even short term hardships in the defence of the country, the leadership does acquiesce to a large standing army and a large defence budget.

However, after a time things do begin to pinch unbearably and then both the nation and the militarymen begin to seek answer to the dilemma.

One answer is what the subject of the Essay postulates. It will be my endeavour to analyse the pros and cons of the Poser and suggest an answer in the following paragraphs.

### NATION BUILDING

At the risk of repetition it may be stated that [Nation Building means development of both material and human resources. Material resources development would imply investment of capital. So would also the development of human resources in terms of education, health and welfare. Thus the building blocks are made of money. Defence also needs the same. The crucial question is how to do all the three.

#### THE DILEMMA

Starkly stated, the more perceptive segment of the Indian Army (more appropriately, the whole military including IAF and the Navy) seem to be faced with a dilemma. They spend 8.6 thousand crores i. e. nearly 20 per cent of the Nation's money. There are associated expenditure which are not budgeted under Defence but are directly or indirectly concerned with it. In this category would fall our space programme, Atomic energy development, much of the R & D, Border Roads, and so on. How much does all the defence oriented activity actually cost is anybody's guess. The Finance Minister in one of the interviews had listed Defence, subsidies and Debt servicing as the three areas which took away the maximum funds.

The Defence is bought at a cost to the society. For instance more money for Defence would mean less money for investment and consumption. Less money for investment means less industries, roads, railways, irrigation, afforestation and exploration of resources. This

would in turn mean lesser jobs and growing unemployment. Next step is frustration bursting in the shape of insurgencies and deteriorating law and order situation across the country. To contain these the coercive force of the Army will be needed. Thus the circuit is completed and needs to be broken somehow.

Raising money from resources needed for consumption means immediate inflation on an already hardpressed society which further results in destabilisation of the society as is being witnessed recently.

Therefore National defence planners may be constrained to consider the idea of assisting in nation building which is primarily an economic activity. However the other side of the coin is that once the military or certain aspects of it (like in a construction job) are specialised they require long periods of training and concentrated attention. The specialised military equipment equally is extremely expensive and it will not be cost effective to utilise it for peace time activities. Above all the defence planner is not capable of shifting the immediate and the ultimate responsibility of defending the country against external aggression as well as internal subversion, on the civil government who in our case are rather innocent of the matters military. Therefore many a time magic and miracles are expected. Hence the military planners decide to err on the plus side and begin to over-insure. The over-insurance takes the form of firstly, threat inflation and secondly in the procurement of latest technology to match or have an edge over the likely adversaries. The former results in large standing establishments of Army, Navy and Air Force and the latter in diversion of billions of rupees to obtain the latest technology. The political leader is unable to moderate for two reasons. Firstly, he has no military expertise and therefore cannot overrule the military recommendations with authority. Secondly, our humiliation in 1962, the stalemates of 1947 and 1965 and the disruptive trends manifest in the country today make it difficult for him to severely curtail the defence expenditure. Thus the vicious circle does not seem to stop. In the meanwhile the investment (economic development) and consumption (the day to day standard of living) continue to deteriorate.

The military so far has got practically all that it has bid for and should therefore be in a happy state of mind. However, the

security that this diversion of resources towards the national security ought to give, has perhaps not been able to assure the military planner of his total superiority against potential adversaries. In July 1962, General KS Thimayya, former Chief of Army Staff stated 'that whereas in the case of Pakistan I have considered the possibility of a total war, I am afraid I cannot do so in regard to China. I cannot even as a soldier envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security'. Basically, our present military posture does not show any substantial change. Even now our military deployment against China caters for only stalemating capability against a small number of military formations which have been computed more on logistical arithmetic than any appreciation based on hard intelligence. Much of the threat from the East would seem to have been inflated as a precautionary measure to guard against a repetition of 1962. We have publically disavowed any intention of imposing our will even on our militarily weaker neighbours. We do not possess the capability to put across and maintain a reasonable force even against Sri Lanka for fear of international complications and intervention. Against Pakistan, we still maintain a parity of sorts. Thus he (the military planner) may feel a sense of guilt at the uneconomic utilisation of a huge chunk of national resources. Therefore perhaps the thought of diverting some of these under utilised resources towards nation building. And sometimes, as James Fallows puts it, "The worst thing that could happen is for the nation to go on a defence spending binge that will create economic havoc at home and confusion abroad".

However, the dilemma that he still faces is that of operational readiness in case these resources are diverted to the task of national building. Also he may wonder whether the time available for training will be adequate to keep his men trained for war ?

There is another more fundamental question. Is it possible to follow the citizen army concept which is followed by approximately 45 countries of the Western World including the most advanced ones such as USSR, Germany, Israel, Yugoslavia and all the Warsaw pact countries ? The USA which has abandoned it since 1973 as a result of the aftermath of Vietnam War, regrets the loss in the operational efficiency in its army due to this reason and has serious thoughts of reintroducing the system.



Therefore there are three aspects which need to be answered while tackling the question of desirability and possibility of involving the army (military) in the task of nation building. These are as under :—

- (a) Operational readiness aspect.
- (b) Training aspect.
- (c) Economic aspect.

#### OPERATIONAL READINESS ASPECT

Over the years we have convinced ourselves that any war that comes about will be of short duration. Our experience of 1947, '62, '65 and '71 seem to confirm us in this belief. However, deeper analysis would reveal that, the wars of 1947, '62, '65 and '71 were either stopped by ourselves unilaterally or by our adversaries for our or their own reasons. The political aims for which the nation may have entered into conflicts were not achieved in 1947, '62 and '65. In 1971 war, our only military success so far, Pakistan was placed in a strategically impossible situation and hence the limited duration of the war. Any future war may not necessarily be of such short duration in case a clash on policy over national interest does occur between us and our adversaries. At any rate it is a short sighted policy to prepare for a short war. It is more often the will to continue a conflict if provoked, that deters our likely adversaries from entering into one. If we do prepare for a long war, the history of warfare tells us that the standing armies serve only as a nucleus for a much more expanded national army raised out of national citizenry.<sup>1</sup>

In the present state the army is deployed in a 'thin red line' all along the borders without any defences in depths worth the name or any plans worked out or resources earmarked to this end. Therefore, to a truthful observer the state of operational readiness as obtaining under the present dispensation is entirely inadequate, should we be faced with a serious external threat to our country at anytime except from Pakistan. China still remains unchallengeable. And we dare not seriously think beyond, even if we loosely talk of a 'Blue Water' Navy and influencing the policies in the Indian Ocean region.



This is perhaps equally true in the case of military equipment where we are deficient of many essential items. The point being made here is that in spite of the expenditure and the present strength of our standing army, our operational readiness is unsatisfactory in the event of a serious external threat or as an instrument of policy to assert our will even on our smaller but refractory neighbours. It is a well understood fact that we may not be able to wage and sustain a war deep into alien territories for any reasonable length of time. Thus it would appear that the argument of having a large standing army for the purposes of instantaneous operational readiness or reaction is not as tenable as it might appear at first sight.

### TRAINING ASPECT

Another argument against the employment of an army in the task of nation building emanates from the idea that such ventures will distract the army from its primary task of training for war. Once again this argument deserves to be analysed more closely. Learning certain trades and jobs is time consuming. Basically the jobs in the Army may be classified in five categories. In the first of such category fall the trades of a strategist, a tactician, a leader at lesser level down to a platoon commander. These men must be retained and continuously exercised in manning and tackling any eventuality that they may be asked to face. The second category is that of the personnel of specialised skills such as tank man's (Armoured Corps), Missiles Pilot's (Mechanised Infantry), Technical Assistant's, Gunners and Operators (Artillery), a Sapper who is trained to lay and breach mines, set up demolitions and construct bridges (Engineers) etc. The other jobs which may be classified in the third category belong to the Corps of Signal, AMC, ASC, EME and RVC. These are primarily civilian jobs which are retained in support of the army to permit smooth functioning of the Combat arms. The fourth category of personnel in the standing army consists of personnel in the AOC and some other Corps who hold and issue the stores. For the maximum wear and tear to these stores occurs due to avoidable utilisation in peace time chores of the standing army. The fifth category which supports the standing army consists of organisations like Provost, AEC, MES, JAG, Audits and Accounts and ministerial staff at all levels to keep the order, enforce the law and keep count and account of whatever may be happening.

It has been observed that most of the combat arms and for that matter supporting arms and services, having done their initial bit of training at their trades in their centres for a year or so, just keep superfluously refreshing themselves without adding a great deal to their professionalism. An analysis in the case of various arms reveals that the following quantum of refresher training noted against each will be sufficient in a year to enable these personnel to perform their jobs competently without having to be paid all the year round :—

(a) <i>Infantry</i>	—	10 weeks.
(b) <i>Armour (Including Mechanised Infantry)</i>	—	12 weeks.
(c) <i>Artillery Technical Assistant and Gunner, Operators and Drivers</i>	—	12 weeks. 6 weeks.
(d) <i>Engineers</i>	—	8 weeks.

**NOTE —**

The above period assumes that these personnel have been given a complete course of one year initially in the Training Centres.

Thus the above review would seem to reveal that the argument of keeping a large standing army with a view to keeping it permanently in a state of coiled spring is again only partially true. An army does not keep training for more than 25% of the time available. The remainder three fourth of the time is consumed in various administrative chores.<sup>2</sup>

This is the case as far as the Combat Arms are concerned. In the case of services such as AMC, ASC, AOC, EME, Provost, AEC, as stated earlier these are primarily civilian jobs in the support of the army and these are most of the time under employed or wastefully employed. The services can be more gainfully employed in manning the civilian jobs during peace time. Thus the AMC doctors can reinforce the meagre medical assistance available in the country; the ASC personnel can be employed in manning the FCI, IOC, and the Supply and procurement organisations in civil; Ordnance can man the public sector undertakings; the EME any number of factories or plants in the public sectors.

There will be perhaps no need or a much reduced need for the category of personnel such as Provost or AEC. The requisite supporting staff of MES, Audits and Accounts and ministerial staff would automatically get pruned proportionately or be more gainfully employed in departments like traffic control, PWD or elsewhere.

### ECONOMIC ASPECT

Central to these issues of economics of defence expenditure is the problem of determining its impact on our economic development and the general price level. There are two schools of thought on the subject. One school<sup>3</sup>, of whose major proponents are/were Emile Benoit of Columbia University an eminent defence analyst, General JN Chaudhuri, and Mr Subrahmanian, suggests that one of the basic assumptions of the defence development dichotomy is the existence of GNP at full employment levels which in practice is rarely the case. On the contrary, defence, particularly in an under-developed country, like India, taps resources that would not otherwise have been employed, generates greater demand through linkage effects in non-military areas, and thereby encourages more production and an overall increase in the economic growth rate.

Professor Emile Benoit similarly concluded that there was a positive rather than inverse-correlation between defence spending and economic growth in India, a finding that also seemed true of most developing nations. According to Benoit, in 1963 and 1964, the immediate years after the Sino-Indian war when Indian defence expenditure reached highs of 4.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent of the GNP, the Indian Gross Domestic Product increased at an annual rate of 6.3 per cent annum. This compared to 4.5 per cent average economic growth rate in the period between 1950 and 1961 when defence received annual allotments of about 2 per cent of the GNP.

Benoit's studies indicated that the sudden increase in defence expenditure after 1962 did not take place at the expense of investment. The average investment ratio (i.e. investment relative to the GNP) was about 16.5 per cent during the three years from 1962 to 1964. This compared to an average of only 12.3 per cent for the period 1951-64.

Similar findings were evident in almost all the 44 developing countries studied by Benoit, and the basic correlation seemed


strong enough so that there was less than one chance in a thousand that it could have occurred by accident.

Similarly, Benoit found that only a small part of an income not spent on defence was put into highly productive investments in the developing nations although in theory direct channelling of defence funds into civilian production might have produced much better results. On the other side, defence programmes had indirectly or inadvertently contributed to the civilian economy through investments in roads in border areas, electronic communications, and spin-offs from ship-building, aircraft and vehicle production.

Subrahmanyam further argued that economic growth was more likely to be a function of productivity, savings and investment.

The other school postulates that a diversion of resources to defence tends to retard economic growth and development and tends to be inflationary. A collapsing economy could be just as much a danger to national security as low spending on defence. The arguments of Prof Benoit, Mr Subrahmanyam and General Chaudhuri had arguable validity till recently whence technological innovations sky rocketed the acquisition and hence prices of both equipment as has been mentioned already.<sup>4</sup> Growth in sophisticated equipment in the Indian Army has been shown below :—

#### PROPORTIONATE GROWTH IN EQUIPMENT



NOTE : Proportionate growth has been shown. Actual figures not indicated for reasons of security.

The cost of manpower is equally substantial. Average cost of p r uniformed man was Rs 40,000/- in 1984<sup>5</sup> for the Army. Also as former cabinet seceetary Mr Khera estimated then there was one civilian employee for every uniformed man.

Another lacuna in the argument of the proponents of the pro-defence expenditure advocates is in the choice of the countries they choose to examine and compare India with i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, and others which are basically dictatorships (Israel is an exception whose motivation comes from deep within the well springs of highest degree of in-security). Otherwise even a country as advanced as USSR has not been able to better its economic growth rate than what it had in 1911. India is on the threshold of an economic take off where additional funds if available would be definitely put to more productive use than what was feasible. Another and equally if not more pertinent point is that additional expenditure in defence is not adding to our defence potential. It is simply being swallowed up by the great cost of equipment and wages rising upward due to inflation.

The increase in defence expenditure since 1962 has been about 1000 per cent. Even allowing for 12 to 15 per cent lowering in purchasing power, this increase is definitely substantial and perhaps unnecessary. Much of it has been due to the increase in the manpower which takes as much as 56% of the total defence budget. One study<sup>6</sup> reveals that the minimum cost of creating a job in the Government is Rs 2.5 to 3 lakhs against Rs 1 lakh in any industry. This is calculated on the basis of salary and other expenditure in a period of about 30 years. Therefore one guesses that creation of a job in the army results in deprivation of 6-8 jobs to other people.

Out of the total number of Government employees, 21% are likely to be serving in the defence. The average central government wages is 4.4 times the per capita income in the developing country as a whole. Thus the 21.5 million Government employees in India consumed 34% of the revenue.<sup>7</sup> Of these 1.3 million are armed forces employees. To this may be added another 1 million civilian employees going by the premise of Mr Khera. The wages in the army are further weighted by about 25 per cent in the form of X factor which pertains primarily to hazards to life and limbs. Thus weighted and compounded, the expenditure on defence personnel may work out to approximately 5000 crores.

Thus it would appear that economically the standing armed forces are expensive, do not provide the optimum security expected as indeed they cannot and constitute an extra ordinarily heavy burden on the national resources which needs to be reviewed.

### A NEW MODEL

The deployment of under-employed Armed Forces personnel or equipment should be only one aspect of the functioning of national security apparatus. The other aspect will be induction of needed and qualified personnel or equipment into the Armed Forces whenever and wherever required. This implies the lien of the nation on every person or material when required for the national defence. Neither the moral nor the practical aspect of such a proposition is questionable. Morally speaking our present system forces only the disadvantaged and hence the least skillful or least motivated to join the Army. Our Pay Commission's report (1984-85) mentions a shortfall of 75.06 per cent in the Technical Graduates Course of the JMA.<sup>8</sup> And the OTS Technical Graduates Course was discontinued due to inadequate response. Two posers may be relevant here. One, should it not be obligatory for the technical graduate to render the service due to the nation when it is called for? Two, must it be necessary for these highly qualified men to waste all their time in doing non-technical things most of the time which they will have to once they dawn the uniform. Same argument may be true in case of medical officers and other technically qualified officers seeking premature retirements. James Follow's observation in this respect about the US Army is equally applicable to the Indian Army "..... Most of the Services had trouble meeting their recruiting quotas. There is also an obvious disproportion between the technical skills required to run and maintain a computerised tank and the training high school dropout (read Indian Villager) brings to the force".

Materially, most of the vehicles, dozers, helicopters, bridges and for that matter any equipment ought to be made use of in civil. This could equally include ships and aircraft. Necessary provisions in the design/structure of the equipment should be made so that it could be comfortably converted for use in Combat. British had successfully experimented with their equipment in this way for Falklands war.



## THE NEW COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY

The new composition which may emerge after such a reorganisation/restructuring may be as under :—

- (a) *Immediate Reaction Force.* This would consist of fully equipped and manned mechanised and paratrooper formations of approximately 10 divisions worth.
- (b) *50 Per Cent Readiness Force.* This segment should consist of 50 per cent of personnel and equipment. 50% of personnel should be 'on-call' notice of one week. Their equipment should be in depots. Strength recommended is 10 Divisions.
- (c) *25 Per Cent Readiness Force.* Pattern remaining the same, warning period should be 15 days and strength again 10 Divisions.
- (d) *'Nucleus' For Expansion.* In addition to these we should have a small nucleus of officers (3), Platoon Commander (12) and NCO (60) to be ready to expand into a battalion. Von Seeckt evolved this model to keep the embryo of the German Armed Forces in being and ready to expand after the Allies had imposed a restriction 1,20,000 men on Germany after the Versailles treaty.

## GENERAL STAFF

In order to have continuity, systematic growth, study and accountability, we should have a permanent general staff who should be entrusted with the planning, equipping, training and organisation of nations defence. This class should again be modelled after the Germans and should be priests in uniform.<sup>9</sup>

## ORIENTATION OF THE POPULACE

Once it has been brought home to the Nation that National Defence is not the burden of the disadvantaged, then orientation of the populace should be planned on the pattern of DOSAAF<sup>10</sup> in the Soviet Union. The elementary skills and orientation which one soldier learns till the time he has done his grade I, should be taught to the children upto high school stage.



### USE OF THE TRAINED AND DISCIPLINED MANPOWER OF THE ARMY

Army retires over 70,000 fit, trained and disciplined manpower possessed of multifarious skills every year. Most of them have yet got many working years ahead of them. They generally go back home disgruntled and feeling somewhat short changed. They begin to form the hard core of various agitationist movements afloat these days. Punjab, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Chambal Valley and so on may serve to illustrate the point.

In the meanwhile our paramilitary forces such as BSF, SFF, CRPF, CISF, GRPF and the civil police<sup>11</sup> continue to spend thousands of crores again to train raw men in the same skills that these men in Army had so assiduously learnt and are being asked to forget. The numbers of personnel employed by various para-military forces<sup>12</sup> is about over half a million. Can there be a cost effective way out of this? Positively. East German Army shows the way.

The East German Army follows a system for the utilisation of such trained manpower which may be well worth emulating. Every able bodied man joins the Armed Forces. In due course his special skills, talents and abilities as well as disabilities are carefully documented. At various stages after the age of 35, he is transferred to a more suitable slot while someone takes his place in the physically more exacting job of the Army. What he is assured of is a retirement age of 60 years. If he is in the Army he becomes a General. If he is elsewhere he becomes a policeman, a banker, an administrator, a mechanic, an engineer, a professor or anything else for that matter. What is ensured is maximum possible degree of contentment and total elimination of hostility towards the Army.

I wonder why must we waste our so carefully trained manpower when we can employ them much more cost effectively and efficiently in an alternative. What will get saved in the process is money again for development.

### CONCLUSION

With the astronomical rise in the prices of military equipment and equally high cost of maintaining a large regular standing Army, it is necessary to give thought to optimum employment of all

its segments at all times. Thus it is desirable and should be feasible to deploy a fair portion of our Army towards more effective employment in the society elsewhere. However, since National security is not a negotiable proposition therefore it is equally desirable and feasible that the National Defence should become every one's responsibility and all resources should be planned to be deployed at the point of need and trained and oriented to this end.

What we require in a democracy is a military system in which everyone believes. In Switzerland the accepted idea is a small regular army with massive reserves. This is enthusiastically supported by the people. Sweden believes in developing its own armaments including aircraft rather than buy from more technologically advanced nations next door because this harnesses both technology and industry to the national determination to be neutral and also to be strong. In our case it would appear as if our military policy and consequently the quantum and shape of the Army is not the result of deductions from a clear statement of national philosophy, policy and objectives. Instead it would seem to be a "product of competition of purposes within individuals and groups and certain phobias".

#### REFERENCES

1. The recruiting system—the long-service army—similarly failed once more. After the first 25,000 men had been sent to the Crimea, all that remained were young recruits. In November 1854 the heights of Inkerman were defended by only 8,000 British infantry. A first reinforcement of seven battalions consisted of 6,000 men; but a second reinforcement of eleven battalions of only 6,500 men. By midsummer 1855 the French army in the Crimea numbered 90,000 men; the British only about a quarter of this figure.  
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The traditional long-service recruitment meant that there were no reserves of trained soldiers in civilian life to swell the army in an emergency.

XXXX A War Office committee investigated all the continental systems of recruitment and terms of service. The Prussian system seemed to have most to offer. It was based on service of only three years with the colours (as against twenty-one in Britain) and four years in the reserve. The Prussian standing army had become simply a training cadre for intakes of conscripts. XXX Nor could traditional recruitment begin to draw in the kind of intelligent and educated men conscripted in Prussia.

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Of the unfortunate rank-and-file of the infantry, the evidence of witnesses and the final Report of the Commission had gloomy things to say.

Reservists were fitter physically than regulars already with the colours. Too many British soldiers were industrial townmen. Most witnesses thought the British rank-and-file was inferior in intelligence (partly owing to lack of education) both to the Boers and to British colonials who joined the war later.

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2. It had been the argument of those in favour of a long service Army that conscript troops could not stand against professionals. The events proved that with modern weapons three years service was as good as twenty.

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3. Information from Dimensions of Indian Defence Spending by Thomas.
4. Norman Augustine, a vice president of Martin Marietta Aerospace says, "From the days of Wright brothers to the F 18 (a current Navy Fighter) aircraft costs have been increasing by a factor of four every ten years. If the trend continues in the year 2054 the entire defence budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft". Quoted in NATIONAL DEFENCE by James Fallows.

Similarly US Army's latest XM1 tank costs as much (in constant dollars) as the Sherman of World War II.

Military unique Video Tape Recorder cost three times as much as a commercial model, a military diesel generator four times as much, a military vehicle twice or thrice the cost of civilian model-ibid.

5. Giri Deshinkar—*Illustrated Weekly Jan 22, 1984*.
6. Prem Shanker Jha, *TIMES OF INDIA 21 Feb 83*.
7. *Ibid* 26 Sep 84.
8. Army's proposals for the Fourth Pay Commission 1984.
9. The Report of His Majesty's Commissioners on the War in South Africa. In 1980, a Royal Commission under Lord Hartington charged with considering the functions of both the War Office and the Admiralty made its report. It was a document of the greatest significance. X X X X X It called for the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief and the establishment of a general staff which would be freed from all executive functions and charged with the responsibility of preparing plans of military operations, collecting and co-ordinating information of all kinds, and generally tendering advice upon all matters of organization and the preparation of the Army for war.

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10. DOSAAF is a Russian acronym meaning Voluntary Society for Cooperation with Army, Aviation and Navy. This was formed in 1951 by a merger of DOSARM DOSAV and DOSO PLOT and revised in 1968. The Ministry of Defence, together with the Voluntary society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), manages, implements, and conducts pre-military training. Formed in middle-1968, the MOD's Directorate for

pre-military Training has assumed responsibility for planning and organising the Ministry's input into the pre-military and specialist training programmes. It is the logical organ for transmission of the future needs of the armed forces—as elaborated by the force components and specialised directorates and coordinated by the Organisation and mobilization Directorate of the General Staff—to the pre-military and specialist training system in the form of quotas. Its task thus embraces the implementation of the Defence Ministry mandate to supervise and support the DOSAAF pre-military training mission.

11. Pre-military Training Programme presents to high school students and working youth at training points and centres. It is designed to provide them with the equivalent of the basic training formerly given to recruits after they were drafted. It was phased into operation in 1968.

The standard programme of pre-military basic training provides 140 hours of familiarisation with military organisations and regulations, small arms use, and civil defence techniques. School students typically spend two hours weekly during two thirty-five-week school years, studying these topics. Workers on the other hand attend three week-long full-time sessions at training centres. These sessions are spaced over a year in order not to deprive enterprises of needed workers. In addition to the requirement of basic pre-military training the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service also directed that educational institutions of the technical-vocational system and DOSAAF organisations manually train specialists for the armed forces. The 1972 DOSAAF regulations state the DOSAAF will provide leadership for the development of military-technical skills, aircraft, glider, parachute, automobile, motorcycle, radio, underwater, motorboat, marksmanship, modelling, and so on. Thus DOSAAF has the basic responsibility for creating, guiding, and assisting in the operation of the expensive network of clubs, schools and other training organisations which prepare specialists in military knowledge and skills for service in the armed forces and, at the same time, the technical professions for eventual employment in the national economy.

12. BSF	—	1,00,000
CRPF	—	85000
State Armed Police	—	200000
CISF	—	45000
Assam Rifles	—	36000
Civil Police	—	1000000

# What is Really at Stake in the INF Negotiations

OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM\*

Negotiations for a 'double-zero' option to remove land-based Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons from Europe have reached a critical point. But what is at issue cannot be understood unless it is seen to relate to the wider debate about the role of nuclear weapons within Western defence planning as a whole. During the General election campaign, preoccupation with the idea of a possible 'independent' role for Britain largely obscured this. It is important that the debate now takes place.

THERE can only be said to be a proper public debate, when the various parties to it are at some point prepared to argue on each other's terms. If they are not, then each ignores the others' premises, and they appear to miss one another entirely. The general public is presented with parallel streams of argument, which draw their strengths from remote and separate sources, and hardly seem to relate to each other at all. This is what happened during the recent British General election campaign. It was exacerbated by the attempt made by all the main political parties to identify their platforms uniquely with principles, which, in fact, all of them shared: for example, the preservation of peace in Europe, through a combination of inner strength within the Western alliance and outer flexibility in relations with the East. In order to distance itself from its rivals, each at the same time tried to present the others in the most unfavourable light, and to deny them this central ground. The result was mutual caricature. The cases that were attacked and dismantled were simply not the cases that were being made. The real debate never took place.

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But there is a real debate about the role which nuclear weapons should play in our future security arrangements. It is the debate which takes place when each of those involved tries to come to terms with what the others are saying. It is a debate which genuinely divides thoughtful and experienced commentators throughout the world, and is one of the crucial debates of our day. As all the protagonists agree, our security, if not survival, depends upon its outcome. Just as British defences are seen to be dependent upon Western and global defence arrangements, so the British nuclear weapons debate can only be understood as part of this wider Western debate about collective security and global debate about common security. This is where the premises are found from which conclusions about British policy are drawn, and here, if anywhere, the rival positions can be related to, if not reconciled with one another. So, what is the international nuclear weapons debate about?

To see things from the point of view of the West, there are said to be three main functions for the nuclear weapons currently deployed by NATO: (1) to deter an enemy from using, or threatening to use, his nuclear forces; (2) to deter an enemy from using, or threatening to use, his non-nuclear forces; (3) to bring hostilities to a swift, and if possible, favourable conclusion should deterrence fail. In order to make these distinctions clear in what follows, the three functions will from now on be referred to in abbreviated form as NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—NUCLERR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS, and NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR, respectively. The first two functions are to do with *deterrence*, the third is to do with *defence*, and the international nuclear weapons debate is focused on the relationship between the two. In particular, it is the relationship between NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIER and NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR which is critical. NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—NUCLEAR WEAPONS formed no part of the original reasons for NATO's deployment of theatre and battlefield nuclear systems, and the Western response to recent Soviet 'zero' options shows that NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS is still seen to be the fundamental function. It is worth pointing out at this stage that apologists for current strategy often try to subsume NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS under NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—NUCLEAR WEAPONS, so that opponents can be discredited as unilateral nuclear disarmers, prepared to leave us



open to nuclear blackmail; conversely, critics often try to subsume NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS under NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR, so that opponents can be discredited as 'nuclearphiliacs', planning for the possibility of nuclear war-fighting. This is what happened during the British general election campaign. But the central debate is not between unilateral nuclear disarmers and nuclear warmongers. Many of the most influential critics of current policy accept NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—NUCLEAR WEAPONS, and are ready to see minimum nuclear forces retained indefinitely by the two superpowers, in order to act as a general restraint and to deter from the possible use of nuclear weapons by both sides. Similarly, supporters of current policy do not accept that they are, in any straightforward sense, 'planning for nuclear war'. The central debate revolves around the status of NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS.

What is at issue is whether we are wise to go on indefinitely deploying new generations of nuclear weapons systems as essential components in a defence strategy aimed primarily at deterring a nuclear-armed enemy from using his *non-nuclear* forces. Those who think that we are wise, take as their starting-point the unavoidable need for NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS (*the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime and its disproportionate non-nuclear military strength make this essential; the graded nuclear options known to be available to the West continue to deter Soviet military adventurism and to underpin the security of the free world; to suggest that there is a credible alternative is unrealistic and irresponsible*). Those who think that we are not wise, take as their starting-point the danger inherent in planning for NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR against a nuclear-armed enemy (*because the carrying-out of NATO's threat to use nuclear weapons to halt a Soviet non-nuclear advance would damage NATO more than the Warsaw Pact, the threat lacks credibility and deterrence is undermined; yet continuing reliance on the myth of nuclear deterrence means that non-nuclear defences, which could be made adequate, are neglected; meanwhile, the vain attempt to restore credibility by deploying increasingly accurate and time-urgent offensive nuclear weapons and increasingly complex and vulnerable command-control systems means that in times of acute political crisis mutual fear of preemption will be increasingly likely to precipitate a collapse into war*). The disputants seem to be looking at the situation from



either side of a critical conceptual watershed. For one, the emphasis throughout is on the effectiveness of deterrence. The stability of deterrence rests on the known risks of what would happen if deterrence failed. So we neither want to reduce those risks (to do so would be to weaken deterrence), nor should we be worried by them (they are unlikely to materialise precisely because deterrence is strengthened as a result). For the other, the emphasis throughout is on the implications of the plans for use. The threat to use nuclear weapons lacks operational credibility, which undermines deterrence. Yet, paradoxically, our commitment to a nuclear war-fighting strategy (which is inseparable from such a threat), means that, as deterrence is seen to weaken, we are therefore more likely to be impelled to use them. One sees a virtuous, the other a vicious circle. For the former, the effectiveness of NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS means that we cannot be said to be seriously planning for NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR; for the latter, the incoherence of planning for NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR fatally undermines NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS. Each begins from a different starting-point and reinterprets the other's starting-point in terms of it. So neither sees the ground the other is standing on, and each can only suppose that there must be biographical reasons why the other nevertheless persists in his argument. Substantial disagreement about issues degenerates towards mutually uncomplimentary judgements about people. The debate does not take place.

But it is very important for all of us that the debate does take place. Let us say that for political reasons it is now generally agreed that we must accept some kind of 'double-zero' option for intermediate-range land based nuclear weapons in Europe. Then it matters a great deal whether this is seen to pose an unwelcome threat to NUCLEAR WEAPONS—DETER—SOLDIERS, or to be a welcome move in the direction of reducing the dangers inherent in planning for NUCLEAR WEAPONS—WIN—WAR. If the former, then we may want to minimise its impact by deploying compensating numbers of air and sea-launched missiles, and by making shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons, which for many critics are most destabilising, non-negotiable. If the latter, then we may want to accompany this by parallel moves to establish a battlefield nuclear weapon-free corridor in Europe, and to work towards an eventual 'triple-zero' option for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons

and dual-capable systems as well. There seems to be general agreement that we have reached a critical moment in the evolution of great power relations, which carries danger as well as opportunity. But which is the direction we should be going in, and how far and how fast should we be moving?

The international nuclear weapons debate is huge, diverge and constantly changing. It takes different forms in different countries. Nevertheless, again and again the two perspectives outlined here are found to act as poles to the debate, reaching out towards remarkably divergent interpretations, not only of matters of broad political judgement, but also of what are generally claimed to be matters of empirical fact. There are questions about relative force strengths and the scope for alternative strategies on the one hand, and about the implications of nuclear weapon modernisation programmes for crisis stability on the other. If these elaborate types of rationale are not related to each other, the debate does not take place, and more or less self-consistent, but partial, ways of looking at things are allowed to develop unchallenged. This is profoundly dangerous when we are dealing with an issue which intimately affects us all as potential beneficiaries or victims, and about which we all agree that we cannot afford to make mistakes.

And this is the only context within which it can make any sense to discuss nuclear weapons options in a country like Britain, all of whose nuclear forces, and nearly all of whose non-nuclear forces, are committed to NATO. Even during the election campaign, conclusions reached about a possible 'independent' role for Britain's nuclear forces, and about the scope for 'independent' or 'unilateral' initiatives, were in any case entirely derived from prior judgements about the relationship between the three functions for deployed nuclear weapons systems in Western defence planning. That is why, in the absence of proper debate about the latter, adequate debate about the former could not take place. Now that the election is over, the danger is that it will be thought that, with the apparent settling of the question of 'independent' initiatives, the nuclear weapons debate is over, too. But the important debate has not yet even begun. The important debate is about the role which the British government should play in helping to determine the overall direction of Western defence planning in response to changes taking place within the

Soviet bloc. It will only take place when the two central perspectives outlined here are related to each other, and argued out publicly and in detail. That is the first point being made in this article. And the second point is that, at a time of crucial change in the nature of great power relations, it is in the vital interest of us all that this should happen.

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# The Colonel Commandant

BRIGADIER A.S. APTE (RETD)

**T**HROUGHOUT the three decades I spent in uniform, I never became consciously aware of any special merit or utility in the army's traditional institution of "The Colonel Commandant". And for many years I didn't quite know what exactly these gentlemen did and how. I knew what they were supposed to do following the historic tradition of over a couple of hundred years dating back to the days when the armies consisted of horsemen and foot soldiers. I knew that these gentlemen, in those days, were generally from the British Royalty, and till the dawn of the twentieth century were called "The Colonels-in-Chief". In Kitchner's reorganisation of 1904, what is now the institution of "The Colonel of the Regiment" came to be sanctioned in respect of the cavalry regiments. The "Colonel" was a senior officer of the regiment accorded this honour by the regiment for his services. The Regal "Colonel-in-Chief" continued in purely honorary and ceremonial capacity till we became a Republic or till the honour holder died, whichever was later.

Those were the days, of course, when the Colonel of the regiment was an invaluable asset, for, with his maturity, long experience and high connections, he acted as a godfather to the regiment. Thus, for instance, if a regiment found itself posted to a godforsaken non-family station far too frequently and for unduly long periods, and all efforts through the normal channels failed to get any results, the Commanding Officer could always turn to the regiment's Godfather... invariably a very senior officer probably still in service, but more often than not, a retired officer—who, by virtue of his position, could write to the Commander-in-Chief or even say to him, "Hullo Old Boy! What's this you are doing to my Regiment?", and get the matter sorted out. By the same token, an officer who found himself 'wronged' by his Commanding Officer (I am talking of genuine cases) and unable to do anything about it because of the Army Act being what it is (and ought to), mercifully had one outlet available to him

in the shape of the regiment's 'guardian angel', the "Colonel of the Regiment". He could confide in him and be sure of getting justice.

Over the years, this glorious institution did not remain confined to cavalry regiments alone ; as the army evolved and more and different types of regiments and corps were born, they too adopted the tradition and in their case their patron came to be known as "The Colonel Commandant".

Passage of time has not failed to make its mark on many an old army tradition rendering what was useful yesterday totally ceremonial and irrelevant today !. Today's Colonel Commandant has no utility ; he can neither move his regiment nor does he welcome any correspondence from his officers and men. As one Colonel Commandant put it (in his letter to me), ".....I feel that the appointment, of the colonel commandants and colonels of the regiments in our present context and environments, is an honour.....an honour to a senior officer recognizing formally his long association with the corps or the regiment. It is a type of honour which is given in all walks of life in recognition of a distinguished service rendered by an individual in that particular field, be it a decoration or honorary degree or anything of the kind. With this honour, he occupies the position of a godfather who has welfare of his protege near and dear to his heart and is there to help when his protege approaches him when in difficulty". Very well said ; but hardly practised today. Not even by the person who wrote this; infact, I happen to know of atleast one concrete instance when he acted in exactly the opposite manner with regard to the 'welfare' of a certain junior officer !

Is mere long association good enough ? These days, for every colonel commandant that exists, there are a couple of dozen senior officers in every corps or regiment who too have equally long and distinguished service. And talking about welfare, I know for certain that they are not any less interested in this aspect than the colonel commandants. My experience, in fact, is that the junior and the middle level officers fight more fiercely to safeguard the welfare of the men they command, for the simple reason that they are in direct and daily touch which them vis-a-vis the senior officers. (I admit that there are exceptions of course; but then everything has exceptions). As for this honour being 'conferred', my own experience tells me a different story : On one occasion, a certain Colonel Commandant's

(CC's) tenure was nearing the end and a vacancy was about to occur. Irrespective of what is mentioned in the previous paragraph, the practice in fact was to 'appoint' the next in seniority through an 'election' (whatever that means). Presently I received a demi-official letter from my top boss in which he hoped that I would vote for 'so and so'. I never stopped wondering as to why there was all that election farce when there was only one 'candidate' !

I discovered long ago that I was not the only one who wondered about the continued usefulness of this traditional institution in the present day context. During the informal chats with my colleagues throughout my long service, I found that there was not even one who thought otherwise. Such of them who have since become CCs themselves, might, of course, hold different views now.

As an ornamental institution, it does not hurt; it only amuses. Even from the taxpayer's angle, it hardly hurts, for, the authorised privileges of a CC are petty—like a few annual visits to various units by air or air-conditioned class by rail at Public expense and some daily allowance during such visits. Perhaps a batman, maybe. Nothing much really. Even the 'unauthorised' privileges are next to nothing if the CC happens to be a retired officer. In the case of a 'serving' CC, these privileges are of course solely on account of his other concurrent appointment, which in most cases is that of the Head of the Arm or the Service.

What exactly is expected of a CC ? As per his official charter he is supposed to foster esprit-de-corps in his regiment or corps; render advice on purely 'regimental' matters like dress, colours, titles, memorials, customs...and the like; maintain close relations between regular and auxiliary units; encourage contact with ex-servicemen; assist in getting good officers into the regiment/corps and extend assistance in organising regimental re-unions. In present day's context, how much of this has any substance in it and how much is airy-fairy ? To find out I approached some fifty-three serving and retired colonel commandants of all the Arms and the Services. Among them some were from infantry and armoured regiments too. And what kind of response did I get ? Absolutely none from one Arm, one Service and all the infantry regiments I had approached ! Out of the remaining 37 CCs, only nine cared to reply. Seven of them had already retired from active service. This in itself speaks volumes for



the interest they have in the 'honour' conferred on them ! Or were they afraid that the bubble of their hypocrisy would burst if they wrote...wrote what ? Perhaps they had nothing to write about ! But then why not say so as indeed a couple of other CCs did ? But little did they realise that by not even showing the courtesy of sending me a simple acknowledgement, their hypocrisy already lay exposed !

I wanted to learn, straight from the 'horse's mouth' as it were the highlights of their activities based on their personal experiences. I wanted to know, for example, in what way they helped out their regiments/corps, not in their capacity of their concurrent appointment (as a senior officer or the Head) but as the guardian angel of the regiment. So I wrote to them, ".....it will be interesting to know about your specific achievements in that capacity—something you could not get done in the normal way by virtue of your high rank or the high appointment as the Head of your Arm/Service/Regiment. Surely there will be many interesting anecdotes to relate....."

I knew for certain that not one out of the 53 CCs I wrote to would have anything worthwhile to convey but I was sure that every one of them would drop in a line or two in acknowledgement of my letter, for that is only to be expected of all Service officers whether or not they are colonel commandants. But when I heard from only nine of them, my 'correct' military mind couldn't digest it. Are we to expect from these gentlemen 'fatherly guidance' in sacred traditions and good manners ? There was yet another jarring note : Some of the 'god-fathers' had, after retirement from service, taken up employment in commercial establishments as general managers, chief executives and so on. Now I had addressed my letters to them in their capacity as the CCs or the former CCs and not as GMs and CEs ! I had not expected to see their replies typed on their firms' stationary displaying very flashy and very unmilitary letter heads of their companies ! Surely I was not one of their customers ! Besides, are their regiments or corps so impoverished that they are unable to provide their CCs some decent official stationary ? And what's wrong with plain paper anyway ? Three CCs used their firms' letter heads, four used plain paper and two (because they were still in service) wrote on their official stationary.

Eight of the nine replies I received were extremely short and so it is easy to reproduce the extracts from all nine of them. I have taken care to conceal their identity.

A Colonel Commandant who was also the Head of his Service, wrote, ".....the real utility of CC will be seen only after my retirement... ..".

A former corps commander who is the colonel of a regiment of an Arm filled most of his letter with family matters and then regretted his inability to help me out rightaway as they were all going abroad for a few months and "Might it not be too late by the time we returned?".

A colonel commandant of a Service eulogised the glorious institution and brought out forcefully what a CC can and ought to do. But, not a word about what *he* did! Astonishingly, he also said, ".....Status of the ranks, vis-a-vis equivalent ranks in the government departments (order of precedence) is also, in my opinion, another important area where considerable amount of work has yet to be done by the CCs to improve the present situation .....". Now this kind of thing is clearly out of the scope or the ability of the CCs; it's purely a matter for the three Service Chiefs to take up with the government. But what I would like to know is what has *this* particular CC done about it, and if not, why not?

Another Colonel of a regiment wrote very candidly, "..... We have now made too many rules and regulations for them and the Colonels-in-Chief could gradually lose the interest and personal relationship with the Regiments. This relationship does not and cannot exist in the case of the Colonel Commandants (meaning corps as against regiments) but we are regretfully trying to end the intimacy in"..... "Regiment" (He named the regiment).

A former Head of an Army replied on his Company's letter head "..... due to my very heavy pre-occupation just before going on leave, I deeply regret that I am not in a position to assist you..... —...". A former Army Commander wrote on plain paper, "..... I am at the moment fairly busy with a number of things and doubt whether I shall be able to spare the time to do what you want..... I have no doubt that you will get plenty (HA !) of material from the

others to whom you have written". I wrote back to both these gentlemen saying that since I valued their experience and views, I had postponed writing my article by a few months and I would be delighted to hear from them again. It would help me even if they jotted their points in just a few lines. I never heard from them again.

Two CCs were frank and forthright in their honest and straight forward replies. One of them, a former Army Commander, said, "Many thanks for your letter. It is very kind of you to want to mention me in your article. I have no particular objection, however I have hardly any anecdotes or experience to narrate". His letter, incidently, was on a Company letter head. The other CC who was equally frank and wrote on plain paper said, ".....I am sorry there is no particular incident which I feel would be worthy of mentioning in your article".

The last letter, part of which I have already reproduced in the beginning of this article, was from a CC who was also the Head of an Army when he wrote it. He said, ".....Till recently all the officers who were appointed as CCs were the Head of the Corps during the service and still more, all of them were immediately engaged in different assignments on retirement, which gave them very little time to devote to the Corps matters or to visit the units. It is only when the tenure of the CCs was reduced to two years after retirement that today, for the first time, we have all the four CCs in service..... During the last couple of years, CCs have visited the units, held Durbars and tried to pick up the general tenor of the Corps. This is as far as the actual position is concerned".

Need I say anymore ? These distinguished senior officers, themselves Colonels of Regiments or Colonel Commandants of their respective Arms or Services have already said everything on my behalf.

And yet, notwithstanding all that I have said above, I feel that the institution should not be abolished; it has its use. If most CCs do not act out their benevolent role, it does not mean that the institution is useless. Its charter needs to be given another look. Why almost all the CCs do not go beyond paying lip service to their duties should be investigated. Perhaps their post-retirement worries leave them with no time or they come in the way of their interest. In

the present day context, unlike the old days, a CC cannot (and perhaps should not) meddle with the movement of his Regiment. But what stops him from securing justice to 'wronged' officers and men? Merely holding a durbar of 'tutored' men is nothing but farce. Let it be declared through the medium of Army Orders that one of the primary duties of these Godfathers is to take up the cause of those who approach them for help. Even this much will keep them busy enough besides making unfair commanding officers a little more careful. This kind of work would be really solid. And worthwhile. Not like giving 'advice' on whether the length of the officers' stick ought to be 24 inches or twenty-three and a half inches! There are other areas too. There was a time, and that was long long ago, when an officers' mess used to be a second home to all the officers of the regiment.

Once you entered the mess, certain formalities were left behind. A general was on par with a subaltern. Of course the usual respect due to the 'fatherly' 'Old Man' was always given, just like what one would do in one's own home. But both the 'father' and his 'sons' still ate at the same table. Fear of the 'elders' was left outside the mess and only 'respect' prevailed. Whenever there was a regimental function, there was never any segregation. The only exception was perhaps in the case of 'vegetarian' and 'non-vegetarian' tables. Never in the case of seniors and juniors. But for the past two decades or so, my observation tells me a different story. Now you have generals and brigadiers tables separately laid out! The rest of the 'janata' cannot eat there. Worse still, if there is a VIP or a VVIP invitee and there isn't much space, even the dining-in youngsters are told to be 'scarce' for the duration of the party and eat their meals in their own rooms! Now this is where a Colonel Commandant can help. He can have a word with the local formation commander and put a stop to such nonsense.

How else can a CC help? He is supposed to uphold good old military traditions, isn't he? Well than, there was a time when military functions—and that included mess parties too—used to have a truly military look. Today they look more like bania's wedding receptions! Richly coloured shamianas, twinkling bulbs all over and after-dinner jokes and skits (in the Officers' Messes) of the kind which ought not to be 'staged' within the hearing or in the presence of the other ranks have become the order of the day. By all means let

there be gaiety. But surely one can be gay without being vulgar. Hired shamianas can never give that dignified yet austere look which the good old khaki or the olive green tent flaps and the 'kanats' presented. Why can't the colonel commandants sort of 'monitor' such straying away from the better of our old traditions?

How many CCs write in their regimental or corps journals? Almost none. And those who write, do not cater for the men; their topics are too high for them. Will it be below their dignity to select a simple, even minor, aspect of their profession and elaborate on it in the regimental journal so as to impress upon the men how important their work is and how every link in the chain counts? In the revised charter, the CCs could be asked to look into the possibility of writing something useful for their journal.

To-day's colonel commandant does nothing besides enjoying a few free tips around the country and the hospitality of the units he visits. He has a lot of free time and he is not using it for the welfare of his protege. All this can be and should be rectified so that the dis-respect with which almost all officers refer to this traditional appointment gives way to respect and admiration. I believe the Air Force and the Navy have also gone in for something equivalent. I hope they learn from our experience instead of starting from the scratch and take precautionary measures at the outset so as to prevent the rot later.

Whatever charter is chalked out for the colonel commandant, let it stand the test: "Is it practicable? Can he do it? How?". If the answer comes out vague, don't include that 'duty' in the Charter. And cut out 'customs' and 'dress' and inconsequential matters like these altogether. Finally, if it is found that a CC cannot really perform any worthwhile duty, then do away with him altogether; he will not be missed!

# An Old Route Across Karakoram Mountains

From Khapalu in Baltistan to Yarkand\*

ROHIT VOHRA

**E**XPLORATION and survey of the areas of the Karakoram mountains, with its immense glaciers and ice-covered mountains, and of the upper Yarkand river upto its source were initiated by Sir Andrew Waugh and General Walker during the Kashmir survey. This was followed by Captain Godwin-Austin and Mr. E. C. Ryall in 1861 and by Mr. W.H. Johnson in 1864 and 1865.

Scientific topography of the region begun by Shaw and Hayward in the later sixties and more particularly the travels of Sir Francis Younghusband in 1887 and 1889 and those of Duke of the Abruzzi and of Dr. T.G. Longstaff in 1909 gave rise to many interesting questions.

*These dealt with the glacier sources of the Opradg and the shyok,  
The headwaters of the Yarkand river,  
The north-eastern watershed of the great Siachen glacier,  
and the whole area on both sides of the main caravan route  
across the Karakoram pass.*

Major Wood who accompanied the Fillipo De Filippi expedition prepared a report in Rome during January 1915 for submission to the Superintendent Trigonometrical Surveys (Wood : 1922).

Exploration of this area brought to light the existance of an old route. This route it appears was only used when the route over

\* Paper delivered at the "3rd Ladakh Conference, 9 March 1987 to 13 March 1987" organised at Herrnhut by the VolkerKunde Museum, Dresden, East Germany.



the Karakoram pass became impracticable-either owing to squabbles between the local rulers, or other reasons<sup>1</sup> and travellers were forced to search for paths west of it. These involved much travel over glacier but formed direct alignments as opposed to the Karakoram pass involving for the Baltis a considerable detour eastwards.

Any route north from Nubra-Baltistan to Yarkand which lay west of the Karakoram pass had to cross the Aghil mountains<sup>2</sup> and the valley of the Oprang river. These were reached after surmounting the glaciers and the ice capped mountains of the Karakoram range.

The route most in use was across the Muztagh pass, situated at the head of a branch off the Baltoro glacier. It had been almost in constant use until the early years of the 19th century. Due to glacial movement its usage became less frequent for the tough and hardy Baltis who often traversed this route to visit their brethren in Yarkand. In Yarkand there was a small Balti farming community which used this difficult but short route. Colonel F. Younghusband was the only known European traveller to have actually crossed this pass.<sup>3</sup> During his explorations in 1889 he also met the Russian Gromchevsky who was proceeding further to Ladakh and Tibet after his visit to the Mir of Hunza.<sup>4</sup>

To the east of the Muztagh pass lie the highest portions of the Karakoram mountain range culminating in the K. 2. massif. Between this group and the Karakoram pass there appears to have existed, according to oral tradition, an old route.

Wood after using the observations of previous travellers<sup>5</sup> was of the opinion "that in the past an old track did run from Khapalu in Nubra to Khufelang on the Yarkand river".

This route from Khapalu to Yarkand followed either of the two tracks :

- (a) *Saltoro valley via Bilaphond La or*
- (b) *the Kondus valley via the Sia La-to the Siachen glacier*

Then descending over the Urdok glacier<sup>6</sup>, at the head of which it crossed the Karakoram range by a pass (possibly the Turkistan La) to the Oprang valley, thence by a pass across the Aghil range

into a tributary of the Yarkand river<sup>7</sup> and from there to Khufelang on the Yarkand river.<sup>8</sup>

The Kalmaks (Tartars) and the Khirgiz often used this route in former times when they penetrated into Baltistan.

Wood himself explored the streams he calls 'I' and 'J' of the map which join the Yarkand river. As he says, "Both these streams rise from a range which must be crossed before the valley between it and the Karakoram is reached (Wood 1922 :21). The remarkable discovery up the stream 'J' of "a saddlebag containing books, some clothes, and a little tea by a porter" led Wood to form his conclusion of this route. "Several of the books were copies of the Koran, in one of which were three opened letters written in Hindi. Nearby we found metal cooking pots and the stock of a native gun." I had the letters translated and found they were dated some ten years ago (1904)" (Wood 1922 : 21).

Wood considered that the Oprang river rose further west and concluded tentatively "the range on the northern slope of which streams 'I' and 'J' rise would in this case be the Aghil" (Wood 1922 : 22).

The findings of Wood's survey were carried forward by K. Mason. In a preface the then surveyor General Brig. E.A. Tandy wrote.

"Geographically the area involved forms the apex of the great divide between the drainage of Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Here we find the sources of Yarkand flowing northwards and of the tributaries flowing southwards to the Indus".

Mason also discovered a dead body. It was in the stream Lungmo Chheh south of Wood's stream 'J', which also joins the Yarkand river. Mason writes "There were two rupees on him, one of which was dated 1918, and a string of turquoises. A little way from the body were six tins of aniline dyes-Clifford was of the opinion that he had died in 1924. We afterwards came to the conclusion that he was a Balti."

The remains of the two travellers show the continued, if not very successful, use of the route along the tributaries of the Yarkand river.

Mason comments, "The discovery was of interest in view of the remains on the ancient route Wood had found in a saddle bag with a Koran and letters in valley 'J'." According to Mason the body may have been of a straggler.

On the general question of the ancient route, Mason mentions the plateau discovered by him and named the Aghil Depsang :

The south west and western boundaries of the plateau were formed by snow capped mountains running to over 20,000 feet, and beyond these we could see the serrated ranges of the Aghil mountains. Surely across this plain must be the 'ancient route'-from Khapalung Aghazi, and over its western watershed, down to the Saksgam" (Mason 1928 : 45).

NOTE ON BILAFOND LA, SIA LA, THE SIACHEN GLACIER AND INDO-PAKISTANI hostilities.

In 1909 Longstaff went up the Bilafond Glacier and crossed the Saltoro range-via Bilafond La-and was the first to gauge the full extent of the Siachen glacier. Immediately opposite to it is the massif of high peaks which he called Teram Kangri. These mountains were part of the northern axis of the Karakoram mountains. Longstaff was also the first to gauge the full extent of the glacier. Earlier in 1892 Convey had followed Hispar, Biafo Glacier to Baltoro.

After Longstaff, the Workmans (husband & wife) went by Bilafond La in 1911-1912 and failing to get on to the Baltoro they went by the Sia La. They also discovered evidence of earlier local visitors. The Fillipo de Fillipi expedition explored the south Terong Glacier.

Stephan Venables "Painted Mountains" describes the ascent of a peak in Kishtwar, and in 1985 the Indo-British Expedition to Rimo Glacier. There is valuable information about the eastern Karakorams and the Siachen Glacier in particular. The appendix IV lists persons and expeditions to the area. It does not however

mention Wood's report used in this paper (perhaps the report was not readily available).

Appendix IV mentions that through Pakistan "a few expeditions were allowed on to the Upper Siachen from Baltistan" (In fact, Appendix IV shows that there were not a few but a great many expeditions)

In 1973 the Indo-Tibetan Border Force made the first ascent of Saser Kangri I from the east. At the same time a number of Japanese expeditions made ascent of Teram Kangri and other peaks (Venable : 214).

In 1978 "Indian army expedition led by Col. N. Kumar climbed Teram Kangri II. The first Indian expedition to venture on the Upper Siachen from Nubra" (Venable : 215). In 1980 an American team led by Galen Rowell made the first complete traverse of Karakoram climbing Siachen, Baltoro, Biafo and Hispar Glaciers. The four men carried their own provisions from Khapalu, only stopping once, at Askole, to re-provision during the six week journey (Venable : 215). "The crux of the route is the Siachen-Baltoro crossing via south face of Sia Kangri...Only one thing mars the elegance of their achievement-politics prevents them from starting at the eastern Indian controlled end of the Siachen, so they have to cut into the upper glacier from Pakistan controlled Bilafond La" (Venable : 216).

In 1981 Col. N. Kumar's second army expedition to Upper Siachen glacier ascended Turkestan La and Sia Kangri.

In 1983 again many foreign parties were allowed to trek from Pakistan via Bilafond La to Siachen and Sia La.

In 1984 "outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan on Siachen Glacier Indian army take control of the entire glacier" (Venable : 216).

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1. The connections between the region of Baltistan and the "Khotan—Yarkand" area are well known from the "Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents Concerning Chinese Turkestan" (Thomas : 1935) beginning from the 7th century A.D. Even the ruling dynasty at Skardu whose geneological records are available from the early centuries of the 2nd millennium A.D. mention their dynastic name as 'Amaccha' (< Skt. : Amatya) which was also the ruling house at Khotan.

'The Inquiry of Vimalabrabha' (Thomas : 1935) provides us some historical information with regards to the marital ties between the ruling houses of Skardu and Khotan and how the rulers were involved in defending the latter place against the Tibetan invasion during the 8th century A.D. (Thomas 1935 : 164, 226-228). During this battle the king of Khotan Vijaya-Vikrama, the king of Skardu Isvara-varman and his eldest son were killed.

The whole situation has to be seen in the context of the struggle for supremacy of Central Asia between the Turks, Tibetans and Chinese during the latter half of the 7th and the 8th century.

2. In 1889 Younghusband was sent to explore the 'main Karakoram and Muztagh range of mountains' and it is during this visit he discovered the Aghil range (Govt. of India 'Proceedings Feb 1890' : 59-84). He writes in the following words about the Aghil Range :

"I have discovered a subsidiary range between the Karakoram and the Kunlun running parallel to them in a north-westerly direction. The name of the country Raskam (Ras Kam) means a 'real mine'."

3. Younghusband ascended the valley of the Sarpo Lago stream towards the old Muztagh pass and crossed it. He calls the pass "never before or since seen by a European" (Ward 1966: 425) and crossed it when coming from Sinkiang. Younghusband pointed out, "There are two passes, known as the Muztagh, which cross the range. One to the east, that is to our left as we were ascending the glacier, is known as the Old Muztagh Pass, and it was used in former days, till the advance of ice upon it made it so difficult that a new one was sought for, and what is now known as the New Muztagh Pass, some ten miles further west along the range, had been discovered" (Ward 1966 : 420). But as Younghusband came upon the Old Muztagh in 1887, he decided to cross via it, rather than change his route.

4. Younghusband made no bones about obstructing Gromchevsky in his mission. He tried to warn the Kashmir Government against him. Earlier, in 1888 Gromchevsky had visited Hunza and the British had come to know about it in 1889. Younghusband wrote a letter to Prince Amar Singh as follows .

"On 24 October I met a Russian near a river at Yarkand. His name is Gromchevsky. He has an application for permission to go to Ladakh and then to Tibet via Tangri. He has been detained at Shahidula Khoja. There

are six sepoys in his company". To the Government (to Durand) he reported that on October 23rd, 1889 he met Gromchevsky when "on his way to the Taghdumbash" (Govt. of India "Proceedings February 1890" : 54-84),

5. Strachey 1853 : 1-69; Younghusband 1896 : 185-186, 208, 217 etc; Shaw : 1876 & 1871; Goodwin-Austin 1864 : 44, 51; Vigne : 1842; Thomson : 1852; Hayward : 1868; Gordon : 1876; Conway 1894 : 286-377; Record of the Survey of India : Vol. VI; Workman : 1917; Neve : 1913; Filippi : 1912.
6. To the west of Urdok lies the Gasherbrum glacier.
7. The 'J' stream of the report (Wood 1922 : Map)
8. The main report of Wood shows that the Fillipo de Fillipi expedition discovered that the Shyok and the Yarkandri vers had a joint origin in the Remo glacier (Wood 1922 : 9).
9. Shaksgam is a river and a valley south of the Aghil mountains and is the area just west of the Siachen glacier. The Chinese have been given this area by the Pakistanis.

*The latest news is that the Chinese are going to survey and demarcate the Shaksgam region.*

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# Kautilya Excels Sun Tzu and Machiavelli

COL SM MALIK

**K**AUTILYA'S Arthasastra "has been compared with the writings of Machiavelli, while at the same time its military maxims have much in common with the earlier ideas of Sun Tzu".

R Earnest Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy in "The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 BC to the Present".

## INTRODUCTION

### GENERAL

Kautilya was a minister to King Chandragupta Maurya in 323 BC. After receiving a rebuke from King Nanda, he had joined King Chandragupta Maurya to seek revenge. It is probably in this venture that Kautilya wrote the Arthasastra as a guide to enable King Chandragupta to expand his empire. It ultimately extended from Kabul to Kamrup and from Kashmir to Karnataka. What Kautilya wrote then, influenced the art of war and diplomacy to such a degree that Chandragupta did not suffer even a single defeat in his reign.

It has been generally felt that, amongst the old writers on warfare, only Sun Tzu or Machiavelli made impact and have some relevance even today. But Kautilya's name is conspicuous by its absence. Considering that Indian civilisation is one of the world's oldest, it is difficult to visualise that no serious thought and effort had been devoted to the art of warfare. It was only in 1905 when Mr R Shamasastri found the Arthasastra in Mysore archives and translated it into English, that Kautilya's brilliance started becoming accepted. Though, he also wrote on warfare's various facets, his name does not figure in the evolution of warfare.

## AIM

In view of the above, the aim of this paper is to compare Kautilya with Machiavelli and Sun Tzu and to restore Kautilya to his rightful place as one of the notable architects of the Art of warfare. This fact is only partly admitted in the opening quotation given in this article and even less acknowledged by the students of warfare.

## WRITING STYLES

Of the three writers, probably the most interesting, flowery and impressive is Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu has theorised on the subject based on his own experience and knowledge, whereas Machiavelli's method of tackling the subject was purely historical. This made Machiavelli turn to history and past to confirm the conclusions drawn by him. Distinctly apart from these styles, Kautilya has practically ignored history and contented himself by imagining all possible situations and indicating ways to meet them. It is just possible, that in the Arthashastra, Kautilya has reduced to writing what was till then being passed from the king to the prince by word of mouth for generations. Thus this made him give a long list of possibilities that appear to have little relevance to the actual situations at any time. "These situations, though appear to be imaginary, but are not far from reality. Each one can conceivably arise". However, this style has made the subject less interesting. This probably explains partly his oblivion and his unpopularity with scholars and students of Art of warfare.


## KAUTILYA ON WARFARE

Kautilya's greatest contribution to warfare has been to evolve the rules for higher direction of war. This could be subdivided under the following heads :—

- (a) Circle of kings theory.
- (b) Sextuple Policy.
- (c) Higher Defence Organisation.

*Circle of Kings Theory.* This theory is based on the frailties of national behaviour, in which we discern the distrust of one nation by another, pursuit of self interest and efforts to secure alliances in order

to gain some advantage over the other. In this theory, state is surrounded by foe and friend in concentric circles. On the side lines are neutral and medium power states. In essence this theory is based on two power blocks which is evident even today in the two super powers i.e. USA & USSR. One concept of circle of kings is given as under :—



*Sextuple Policy.* In the sextuple policy, Kautilya sums up the foreign policy to be adopted by the king to extract maximum benefits. The present cold war tactics are not very different from what Kautilya recommends. Few examples from his policy are :—


*Sandhi or the Policy of Peace.* Kautilya advised the defeated party to outwit the victor while fulfilling the terms of the treaty and after biding his time to overthrow the enemy. While concluding the treaty of Versailles, Germans acted exactly according to Kautilya's advice and thus regained strength to wage another world war.

*Sambhuya Yana or the Policy of Marching Collectively Together.* The formation of allies and axis powers in the Second World War is an ample testimony to this policy. The possibility of one party cheating the other was also contemplated by Kautilya. USSR demonstrated it, when she rushed ahead of her allies to grab hold of a part of Germany in the Second World war.

*Dvaidhibhava or the Double Crossing Policy.* It is declaring peace with one and hostility with another and later attacking the state with whom one is at peace. Hitler used it when he managed to secure a peace treaty with USSR prior to his invasion of France. Later he attacked unsuspecting USSR too.

*Samasraya or the Policy of Seeking Protection.* Kautilya advised it to a weak king who must seek protection to negate the evil designs of the enemy. England sought the hand of USA in the Second World War, when she was driven to her island fortress. Kautilya advises even surrender but the surrendered king must revive his strength and overcome the oppressor.

*Higher Defence Organisation.* While recommending modifications to the Indian Higher Defence Organisation Maj Gen SK Sinha, PVSM (Retd Lt Gen) in his article 'Higher Defence Organisation in India' (Military Digest Apr 76, P 44-46) praises the organisation given by Kautilya. Lt Gen Sinha says that Kautilya's Organisation "had all the ingredients of a modern Higher Defence Organisation". It ensured the supremacy of civil and coordination between the two services ie the Army and the Navy as also between different components of an Army. It provided for a committee type of defence organisation at the top. The organisation at Kautilya's time was as given below :—



## KAUTILYA VERSUS MACHIAVELLI

### MACHIAVELLI'S PHILOSOPHY

Machiavelli's philosophy is based upon his own experience. He does not have any pre-conceived ideas about the human nature. "His



book "The Prince" is bestrewn with truths which can be proved at every turn. Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be, and are ruined". His experience convinced him that politics cannot be regarded as function of ethics. He regarded independence, security and well ordered constitution as the most important ends. "Thus Italy found in Machiavelli's work the ideas of her unity and the germs of her renaissance among the nations of Europe". Only when Machiavelli asserts that ends justify the means in political fields, that he has been severely criticised. His intellectual honesty about political dishonesty proved repulsive to idealists.

Mr BK Sarkar sums up Machiavellism admirably to two cardinal dicta.

- (a) "The enemy, actual or potential must be crushed at all costs. And here end justifies the means.
- (b) The manner in which a person behaves as the servant of a group, party or state must be different from that in which he appears as an individual, in regard to other individuals".
- (c) He (Mr Sarkar) adds, that both these principles are also at the basis of the Arthashastra's teachings.

#### SIMILARITY OF VIEWS

In trying to equate Kautilya with Machiavelli, Kautilya earned the wrath of many Indian observers. They described him as wily, wise, unscrupulous, alert, diplomatic Brahmin who did not hesitate to permit unscrupulous and unfair acts for the good and greatness of the state. Few examples of Machiavellism from the Kautilya's Arthashastra are enumerated :—

- (a) To Kautilya state is every thing and an end in itself. Machiavelli holds the same view.
- (b) Machiavelli advocated expansion at other's cost. Kautilya's motto was self aggrandizement at other's expense.
- (c) To achieve the above, both wanted the enemy to be crushed at any cost.

(d) No moral scruples were impediments to achieve the objective. Even prostitution was legalised for getting secrets of the enemy.

(e) Large espionage department as suggested by Kautilya, shows that he conceived state above the law.

(f) "That is why Kautilya has been referred with contempt in several texts of sanskrit literature. Visakhadatta called him katilamati or one with crooked intellect".

Similarly one could find numerous dicta in "The Prince" which Kautilya would have clearly endorsed. A few examples are :—

(a) He who has relied least on fortune is established as the strongest.

(b) Man ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of the lighter injuries of more serious ones they cannot.

(c) That war is just which is necessary and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope left in them.

#### KAUTILYA'S SUPREMACY OVER MACHIAVELLI

Although Mr MV Krishna Rao says in "Studies in Kautilya" that "It is clear that Machiavelli and Kautilya are two planets in different parts of the Firmament with different gravitational pulls", but there the similarity ends. According to Indra such a comparison is untenable. The reasons for holding such view are :—

(a) *Intellectual Acumen.* In intellectual acumen and comprehensiveness of outlook, Kautilya was far superior. Kautilya was a practical statesman, to whom Chandragupta owed the foundation and consolidation of his empire, whereas Machiavelli had rudimentary experience. Kautilya's political ideas contained in the Arthashastra continued to be accepted by his posterity but "The Prince" could not leave any abiding ideas behind him.

(b) *No Relieving Feature.* Machiavelli had no relieving feature in his teachings. He advised the king to be a brute & remain

one even towards his own subjects. But Kautilya advocated the principle of paternal kingship. Except in war, Kautilya did not support departure from morals.

(c) *Not a Rank Militarist.* Kautilya was not a rank militarist. His sextuple policy and four fold expedients indicate that when all other measures were exhausted, then alone did he favour war. Dr Kalidas Nag summed up beautifully the position of Kautilya in the matter. "The so called Hindu Machiavelli though very independent in thought, is not non moral, when the advantages by peace and war are equal".

From the above discussion it emerges that Kautilya outdoes Machiavelli by his brilliance in conceiving all contingencies. Rather the comparison being done by most observers is partial since Kautilya's ideas and teachings are mentioned out of context and when these suit Machiavelli's views. One gets a feeling that Machiavelli had not delved deep and thus came out with superficial conclusions. Neither did Machiavelli really touch any strategic or tactical matter, whereas Kautilya's Arthasastra had done justice to the subject.

### KAUTILYA VERSUS SUN TZU

#### GENERAL

Sun Tzu lived before 474 BC in China as a general to king of WU. Sun Tzu was introduced to the Western World in 1772 in Paris by French missionary's summary translation of his book'. "The Art of War". This gave the western strategists and thinker's over two centuries to examine his theories and thoughts, whereas Kautilya's Arthasastra was found in 1905 by Mr Shama Sastry. Thus Kautilya has not yet been properly exposed to and accepted by the western world in the same manner as Sun Tzu. But in this period people have realised the similarity of views of Kautilya and Sun Tzu on military matters.

#### SIMILARITY OF VIEWS

Sun Tzu felt that war was the concern of the state. He felt that the moral strength and intellectual faculty of men were decisive in war. He desired that war be preceded by actions which would make it easy to win. He said "that the master conquerer frustrated enemy's

plans and broke up his alliances". Spies and agents were to sow dissensions and nurture subversion besides gathering information. The enemy was to be isolated, demoralised and his will to resist broken. He advised war only when enemy could not be subdued by these means. He favoured short wars with minimum cost in terms of effort and lives. These views and observations are in consonance with Kautilya's. Besides these, similarity is also evident in the following spheres :—

(a) *Strategic and Tactical Doctrines.* Sun Tzu based his doctrines on "deception, creation of false appearances, indirect approach, flexible and coordinated manoeuvres of separate combat elements and speedy concentration against point of weakness". For such tactics highly mobile and well trained troops were required. These teachings are evident in Kuta Yudha. Kautilya also realised the importance of mobility since army was organised into groups capable of varying speeds and strength ie infantry, elephants, cavalry and chariots.

(b) *Composition of the Armies.* Sun Tzu witnessed feudal armies but Kautilya gives a very scientific composition which includes all elements in correct proportions. Both agree that army's tactical elements should be capable of independent and coordinated manoeuvres and responsive to control.

(c) *Importance of Forts.* Both in India and in China, field operations were conducted from fortified camps. Chinese forts were surrounded by walls and moats. However Kautilya recommends upto three moats. Methods of laying siege to a fort appear to be similar.

(d) *Pre-requisite for successful Expedition.* Both emphasised the need for national unity before embarking on an expedition. Both advocated prior analysis of the factors which constituted military strength. Both recognised the value of high morale and exhortations by the leaders to the soldiers. Both understood the value of leadership and outlined qualities desirable in the leader.

(e) *Elements of Warfare.* Sun Tzu and Kautilya understood the strength and weakness of men. They realised the importance

of seasons, terrain, mobility and destructive power and knew how to employ them. Both advocated use of fire as a weapon.

(f) *Indirect Approach.* Both favoured Indirect Approach and preferred to take the objective from an unexpected direction. Siege was considered as a last resort by both, being uneconomical.

(g) *Administration.* Both regarded administration as a principle of war. Rather they felt, "that a wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy".

(h) *Treatment of Captured State.* Both advocated that the captured state should be preserved and not ruined.

(j) *Psychological Warfare.* Both realised that indispensable preliminary to battle was to attack the mind of the enemy commander.

(k) *Secret Operations.* The employment of spies and agents has been covered in detail by both and is similar. Both mention double agents and the need for compartmentalisation and multi-level operations.

#### SUPERIORITY OF KAUTILYA OVER SUN TZU

While studying "The Art of War" and 'Arthasastra' one is impressed by the tactical knowledge and the military strategy of Sun Tzu. While Kautilya may not have been able to put them in as poetic and flowery a language as Sun Tzu's, he understood the essentials and put them across by way of examples. But this study reveals a number of areas in which Kautilya has excelled even Sun Tzu. They are :—

(a) *Higher Direction of War.* Though Sun Tzu understood the difference between national and military strategy, he did not pay any attention to National strategy, whereas Kautilya with his concept of Circle of Kings, Sextuple Policy and Fourfold Expedients has discussed the subject with deep understanding and experience. With his concept and policies, Kautilya wanted to consider not only the state of affairs within the state, but also in the sphere of kings outside his state.

(b) *Higher Defence Organisation.* Only Kautilya has given to us the Higher Defence Organisation and this seems to have

eluded even Sun Tzu. Probably Sun Tzu delved deeply into the tactics of war since he was a general and had commanded armies in battle. It is commendable that only Kautilya thought of the Naval Department and also included it in the Higher Defence Organisation.

(c) *Secret Operations.* Although both understood secret operations it is Kautilya only who has given us a detailed analysis of the organisation and the worth of each type of spy or agent.

(d) *Composition of the Army.* In the composition of the Army, Sun Tzu does not refer to Cavalry, although the horses were there. Probably he did not recognise this form of mobility, which could not escape the eagle eyes of Kautilya.

(e) *Method of Tackling the Subjects.* Mr BN Liddell Hart in the Introduction to 'The Art of War' says. "Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight and eternal freshness". However, these words can equally be applicable to Kautilya. But the basic difference in their works has to be understood. Sun Tzu was dealing with generalities, whereas Kautilya dealt with specifics after having considered general principles and then related them to form a manual for the king. This would make an advisor superfluous if not redundant. But with Sun Tzu's book one has to relate his truths to specific contingencies. This would need an advisor all the time.

### ASSESSMENT

From the above comparison it is evident that Kautilya is far superior to Machiavelli and compares favourably well with Sun Tzu and even outclasses him in certain spheres such as Higher Direction of War and Higher Military Organisation. This is so, due to Kautilya's higher level of thinking and sheer insight into human psychology. Although Liddell Hart eulogises Sun Tzu by saying "Sun Tzu covers in one short book almost as much about the fundamentals of strategy and tactics as I have covered in more than 20 books", the brilliance of Kautilya is evident, since in one Arthashastra he has covered all of Sun Tzu and much more.



# To Dare where Angels and Civilians Fear to Tread

MAJ S T APPACHANA (RETD)

THE experience of thirty nine years has established that reservation and preferences in civil re-employment to Ex-servicemen is rarely implemented. There is even less hope in the now increasing climate of inflation and unemployment. Worse, pleading destroys military prestige. Re-employment must therefore essentially concentrate on certain spheres distasteful to the civilians, out of the rat race ! To elaborate, civilians as a rule, are not trained to the physical hardihood or mental stamina for sustained field work,—least of all, to work outside the comfort of urban areas, in jungle, mountain, and desert. Civilians do not yet care for the worlds of opportunity in strategies of unconventional/renewable energy and potentials in productive recycling varieties of waste. They conduct excellent seminars. However, implementation of these, open immense possibilities of re-employment and self employment to Ex-servicemen.

Again, the directorate general of re-settlement could keep close liaison with all central/state developmental projects at the earliest stages of the feasibility report, board-room and blue print phase. This would reveal from project authorities the particular areas of work, which need the risk taking ability, toughness, team work and time-bound systems of pre-trained military teams and the required technical, administrative skills, in construction work largely. The DGR could then brief the regimental release centres located in the concerned states, to prepare suitable cohesive work groups of composite skills, with regional loyalties catered for, wherever possible. As examples, the Maratha Light Infantry, Mahar Regt Centre and Bombay Engineer Group could cater for state projects in Maharashtra. The pre-training of individuals and collective co-operative model teams, is a vital preliminary. The regimental release centres, adequately staffed with instructional specialists from military or civil resources become kingpins of this scheme. Work teams in

this circumstance should be formed by a secret ballot system to ensure dedication.

Examples of projects calling for a soldier's endurance, his basic experience in map to ground survey, liaison in air reconnaissance and sketching skill,—to quote a few, are survey projects in the vital sphere of national water resources and catchment areas, mineral and oil resources, conservation of forest resources and botanical survey—in fact all exacting survey work, involving camping, trekking and mapping. Tapping national water resources in high altitude or uncongenial source areas with its specialised construction skills can be a *permanent* re-employment avenue to released armed forces officers and personnel. They alone can work on a war footing in a country totally dependant on the vagaries of the monsoon.

Officers and ORs, during pensionable service of 15/20 years, can be trained to it,—through condensed courses in military or civil Training Institutes. As an example, tribals in the forests of Madhya Pradesh have picked up the skills of surveying for tin ore with practical training, by the task forces of the Survey of India. Skills for water resources are simpler but tougher.

*Enlargement—Employment avenues* : A paramount principle to be observed in enlarging employment opportunity is that armed forces personnel must through sustained training, during colour service, appear and excel in the standard tests, which apply to civilians for employment in the above critical areas. Ex-servicemen not having the equivalent civilian standards of education *must be tested practically* for the job. No favours and concessions, is a new principle to be kept in mind. Volunteers retiring young, on eligibility to full pension, is an essential prelude,

Again, there are major civil employment resources within the army itself, which without pre-training are sadly under-utilised. Military clubs, rest, holiday and transit camps, all the branches of the canteen services and branches of the District Soldiers Board, can be staffed with ex-servicemen, appropriately trained in civil and military institutions before release, utilising opportunities of relevant military and civil courses, during well spaced furlough/study-leave periods. Not the least important, officers and personnel, *qualifying*, can be transferred, when near the end of Infantry/Arms tenure, to service branches like the ASC, Ordnance, Army Education Corps,

the JAG branch, and even Admn branches of the AMC, with their higher age extension rule. There is also the added benefit of the ultimate user being represented, besides the infantry becoming a more attractive Arm, as a conduit to greater security and long term employment. The well rounded experience gained is a further asset to civil re-employment.

#### SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT AGAINST RESERVED JOBS

As a principle, civil re-employment could be reserved in like calling with which the officers and personnel were most familiar during service, at the end of a condensed civilian course and attachment in the required specialisation. Released Infantry officers and soldiers trained in para-commando operations could be inducted into exclusive, special units of the CRP, SAF and PAC to deal with Airport and Bank security and as distinct specialists in crash action for disaster relief. NCOs trained in Medical Hygiene, sanitation and anti-Malaria courses, with long experience in such work, during Military service, could be fitted into some reserved posts in Cantonment/Municipal Sanitation and anti Malaria staff. Better still, if such categories, are assisted with capital and technical help to establish public bathing and toilet facilities in cantonment bazar area, major bus terminal, etc.--public payment being by modern slot machine or coupons. Military drivers with records of long tenure in mountain divisions could be given preferential self employment facilities to open taxi and tourist bus services in the area, where they served, besides being trained and assisted to obtain civil license for all types of vehicles, and in addition, international driving license, obtained during service. Skills are thereby reinforced for military needs,—specially when recalled to service in an emergency. This is a vital aspect, the need of such extra qualified Ex-servicemen for the Army itself, when they are young enough during the first three years of release, to do a further stint in lines of common areas and in security tasks of vital installations.

#### TRAINING

Primary training is the education facilities available in unit resources. The unit commander with his attached section of the Army Education corps can achieve miracles for ultimate re-employment chances. Resettlement training, essentially dual purpose, has to be spaced throughout the service, so as to ensure excellence in

a specialisation, from which the benefits are as far as possible for military purposes as well as for the soldiers' re-settlement. As an example, a military typist clerk should be intensively trained during his average fifteen years service in shorthand, book keeping, secretarial courses from civil/government recognised schools, subsidised by the Army, so as to lure him after release, as a civilian personal assistant, to military formations or find other civil job on the sheer merit of sustained training. All re-settlement training should be, as far as possible, where military resources are not available, from the nearest civil institutions, subsidised by defence, so that military training is least interfered with. Again, to be entirely out of the rat race with civilians, the soldier has to be trained in all methods of unconventional energy and be also adept at re-cycling any salvage material for his sustenance in ultra comfortable family camps at remote developmental project areas of re-employment.

Specialised re-settlement training has to be decided by aptitude tests during the earlier phase of service. It has to be so oriented as to make a soldier self-reliant in his piece of ancestral land, in his village, or as part of a state development project team, in a jungle or a mountain sector, where civilians are not easily lured to serve. The uncongenial areas of his own state should be the released soldiers' privilege to develop and his right to colonise with state aid. The malarious Terai made fruitful by the desperate Punjab refugees is an example.

A paramount advantage of officers and personnel pre-trained during colour service, as developmental work teams, is that they can be quickly recalled to colours, with their distinct identity, skills and high morale, in case of national emergency. As an example, a signal officer or other rank re-employed in the civil post and telegraph service or police wireless system is ever in a state of readiness for recall, for active service with added potential for organising civil liaison.

The last three months of service before release, has to be a peak period of crash course in the specialisation of the individual, and *collective* training of developmental *work groups*. Demonstration of individual and team skills to entrepreneurs and project executives, is imperative, for example, construction of a bus-stop public shelter, a milk distribution kiosk, or a culvert, in targeted time for public

exhibition. Annual military tatoos exhibiting a Military team's civilian skills and competing with civil teams, at all regimental release centres is a must.

The fundamentals of soldiers co-operatives has to be a part of progressive training instruction during the entire period of service. It also reinforces even more intimate cohesion in war.

Training of the soldier's wife has to be carried out with the same seriousness and regularity, using primarily military salvage as training material. As an example, a soldier trained as a carpenter, would need that his wife is trained in varnishing and polishing wood work and caning chairs. It would help soldiers trained to make tentage or tailoring, to have wives trained in splicing tent ropes and in stitching over-alls and jeans, from the inner flies of salvaged tents,—the true origin of jeans !

#### TRAINING MATERIAL

The use of military resources in training and training materials has to be exploited to the full, where the benefit accrues dually to the military profession and the soldier's re-employment. Military salvage is an excellent source of re-settlement training material. To elaborate, the recycling of metal, machine parts, wood, cable, aluminium, leather and cloth from military salvage to manufacture energy items like bio-gas digesters, water pumping wind mills, solar cookers/heaters and converting the inner flies of tentage, to stitch workers denim overalls, by soldiers' wives, has to be a well organised re-settlement training. Briefly, an OR, after fifteen years service, should with such pioneer training, be capable of building his own cottage out of wood, sun-baked bricks and salvaged wooden and metal structurals, to live in comfort with his family in mountain, jungle, or desert reclamation projects, with lighting and cooking from bio-gas/solar cooker and water electricity from wind mill power. Teams collectively trained during colour service, should be similarly capable of building a school or workers mess for the project camp of an ex-servicemen's co-operative work force on a state project. Such training, specially in unconventional energy items, also helps a betterment in self-reliant comforts for field firing and non-tactical training camps, as well as field tenures, during colour service. It might even save unnecessary use of unit funds, which can be diverted to such pioneer training.



Military codes of enrolment stipulate that duties will be carried out 'even at peril to life,' terms that confer a distinct responsibility to the cadre of Ex-servicemen to prove itself as an elite cadre for civil re-employment. In this context, equation of civilian and military men on pay-scale terms is totally redundant. The winning point has to be that individually, or as a team, a military team can do it "Faster, Better, Stronger", in civil projects, dealing with developmental work, disaster relief or anything visualised for completion on a war footing. To bring the Ganga from the glaciers of Gomukh in a garland canal to the Kaveri can absorb all Ex-servicemen in a battle to give life after the best years spent in learning to destroy life.

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
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## The Galley's Historic Voyage

The Punjab Regiment is the oldest one  
In the glorious Indian Army,  
In the 18th Century it's inception began  
As troops of East India Company.

From days of Veteran Robert Clive  
It's stood the test of time,  
Our soldier's guts, grit and drive  
Remained throughout sublime.

As Coast Sepoys the Regiment rose,  
To Carnatic Battalions it charged.  
As Madras Infantry it formed a force,  
Recruitment from South remained.

At AVA and at SHOLINGHUR  
It fought to win those days,  
At CARNATIC and MYSORE  
It held the enemy at bay.

Gradually troops from North came in,  
Lord Kitchner planned a revision,  
Punjabi Battalions with troops skim,  
Were formed under Kitchner's supervision.

Lord Wellesley formed a new plan,  
The creation of Infantry assortments.  
In 1922 thus began,  
Our Second Punjab Regiment.

The 'Galley' as badge was then given,  
 And 'Khushki-Wa-Tarri' our motto.  
 Our Punjabi Battalions were driven  
 To sail with the 'Galley' in-toto.

The Second World War brought us fame  
 Through heroic exploits of many,  
 After partition too we fought again,  
 With China and Pugnacious Pakistanis.

PARA And GUARDS through us were formed,  
 And PEPSU Forces we gained,  
 Glory though wars we adorned,  
 Eleven Battle Honours we attained.

Through Alex we grew, with Mahadeo we flew,  
 In Thorat and Aurora we pride.  
 With Jaswant and Sidhu we grew anew,  
 Now we sail with Taylor as guide.

In excelling wide the Galley prides,  
 From Jessami to Jaisalmer across,  
 From Kargil's ice to Trivandrum's tide,  
 We abound in experience gross.

Except love, faith and loyalty,  
 The Gally wants nothing more,  
 She has and will bring royalty,  
 And we love her to the core.

— Maj Anil Shorey

# The Defunct 'College of Fort William'

Wellesley's 'Oxford of the East'

LT GEN S L MENEZES PVSM (RETD)

H. E.A. Cotton in 'Calcutta Old and New' (1909) records, 'The College of Fort William, on its establishment in 1800, was located on the southern side of the square in the premises at the corner of Council House Street, subsequently occupied for many years by Messrs. Mackenzie Lyall and Co., and known as the Exchange. The house is now tenanted by the Bengal Nagpore Railway Company. Another building opposite (then soon to be demolished) was also appropriated by the College, and the two were connected by a gallery across the street. As we linger at this corner of the square, we muse upon what might have been, if Wellesley had been permitted to carry it out, for the scheme was to find fruition in a splendid college at Garden Reach.' Cotton does not elaborate further. What was the 'College of Fort William', and why did it not find 'fruition' ?

The story of the Fort William College, founded in 1800 by Wellesley, is of some historical interest. The then Governor General intended to make it 'the Oxford of the East'. As averred by Peter Mudford in "Birds of a Different Plumage" (1974), "his attempted contribution to the civilization of 'Anglo-India' was notable; in particular, his view of the importance of a proper training for future administrators." On 18th August 1800, Wellesley announced the formation of a College of Fort William which would provide civil servants with an education in Oriental languages and history, as well as continuing their instruction in traditional European subjects. The actual opening of the College of Fort William dates from 24th November 1800, on which date lectures commenced in Arabic, Persian and Hindustani. The notice of these lectures is signed by

Rev. David Brown, the first Provost, dated Council House Street, 15 November 1800.

In the following four years, Wellesley realized part of his ambition, collecting for the College distinguished Indian scholars, and a group of able Orientalists, John Gilchrist, Henry Colebrooke, William Carey, and Francis Gladwin among others, who carried on the pioneer work done by Halhed and Sir William Jones.

Wellesley formulated a statement of purpose, as well as a curriculum. These he outlined as follows : "To dispense justice to millions of people of various languages, manners, usages, and religions, to administer a vast and complicated system of revenue throughout districts equal in extent to some of the most considerable kingdoms in Europe; to maintain civil order in one of the most populous and litigious regions of the world : these are now the duties of the larger proportion of the civil servants of the company." In his opinion, the terms "writer, factor and merchant (were) utterly inapplicable." Members of the Asiatic Society of Bengal were invited to lecture on 'The History and Antiquities of Hindustan and Deccan'.

In 1801, William Carey was appointed Professor of Sanskrit, Bengali and Marathi at the newly established College. He created a Bengali Department, and the following extract from his letter to the Council of the College shows his zeal for promoting Bengali language and literature, 'Convinced as I am that the Bengalee language is superior in point of intrinsic merit to every language spoken in India.' At first the College used Carey's missionary press at Serampore, now supported by the Government, but soon also became a centre for printing and publishing, as well as teaching. Gilchrist started a Hindustani press in 1802; in 1805 and 1807 Persian and Sanskrit presses were also established. By 1810 Colebrooke had published 'The Translation of Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance' which aimed to help European students, while Carey, as well as producing a Bengali grammar, produced a three volume dictionary containing 80,000 words. Gladwin, the first Professor of Persian at the College translated the 'Ain-in-Akbari', the 'Memories of Khojeh Abdulkerrim', the 'Tuti-Namah', 'Sheikh Saadi's Gulistan', and also produced dictionaries in English, Persian, Arabic, apart from a Dictionary of Religious Ceremonies of the Eastern Nations.

Inspired by Carey's personal example and encouragement, Bengali books in good prose were written by some of the Pandits of the College, notably Ramram Basu, Mrityunjay Vidyalkar and Rajib Lochan Mukhopadhyaya, whose first works were published respectively in 1801, 1802 and 1805, whereas Rammohan Roy published his first Bengali book, 'Vedanta grantha' in 1815. The students of the College benefited from a view of India that was bound to impress on them its manifold facets, but it was also important in its appointment of Indians. Excluded by Cornwallis from other important activities, the Indian scholars of Fort William formed a nucleus, whose significance was to become political as well as educational. The Fort William College also brought about cooperation between English and Indian scholars on a scale that had never occurred before. To Wellesley, the College was a matter of deep personal conviction. He even went so far as to say that 'the College must stand or the Empire must fall'. Charles Grant, an evangelical and a former member of the Board of Trade in Calcutta had in London in 1792 published his 'Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic subjects of Great Britain, particularly with respect to morals and on the means of improving them.' The Court of Directors, influenced by Charles Grant, did not share Wellesley's enthusiasm for the scheme, especially since Wellesley had gone ahead without their permission, investing considerable funds in its establishment. At this juncture, according to Michael Edwardes in "Glorious Sahibs" (1968) Wellesley described himself as a Bengal tiger 'without even a friendly jackal to soothe the severity of my thoughts'. Grant urged that there was no advantage to an institution which would help the young administrators in the assimilation of a culture and religion that was 'degrading' (sic). He argued that a better way of grounding them in the necessary Oriental languages was for their training before they left England, under the supervision of scholars from Cambridge. The Court of Directors' approval was given to this idea in 1805. The East India College opened at Hertford Castle in 1806, moved to Haileybury in 1809, and continued in existence till 1858. From 1805, the significance of Wellesley's 'Oxford of the East' declined. It continued in existence for the training of civil servants who were expected to serve in Bengal. By the time it was finally closed in 1854 it had 'no buildings, no rooms, no professors, no lecturers, but only a few Moonshis whom the Government pays but who have no employment.'

Wellesley's College of Fort William, in Mudford's view embodied at its inception a 'great idea; and 'its death under the influence of narrow sectarian fears represented an important setback for the growth of contacts and communication between English and Indian civilization. With its wide ranging courses in Oriental languages and history, as well as its continuing European education, the University could have served (at the time) as the centre for the exchange of ideas and information at many levels. Like other possibilities in 'Anglo-India' the opportunity was lost through the assertion of a religious and cultural superiority which proved its weakness by its fear of challenge and criticism.'

By 1821, Major General Sir John Malcolm was recording, 'I do not think that there is a human being (certainly no Nabab or Maharaja) whom I should dread half so much as an able Calcutta civilian whose travels are limited to two or three hundred miles, with a hookah in his mouth, some good but abstract maxims in his head, the Regulations in his right hand, the Company's Charter in his left, and a quire of foolscap before him.' Had the College of Fort William continued at Calcutta, it could have been the precursor of the present National Academy of Administration, and would have been observing its 187th anniversary on 24 November 1987.

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## Book Reviews

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY : THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

EDITED BY L. L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR AND UAI RA'ANAN

Published by Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut 1984 ; Pages : 311 ; Price : \$ 32.50.

THIS book is the outcome of a major conference held by the International Security Studies Programme of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, during April 1983, to examine the main problems relating to decision-making and the development of national Security policy, primarily in the USA. Distinguished experts in all relevant fields were invited from the US and abroad to participate in this conference for an in-depth study of vital issues of national and international security. With an interesting introduction written by Admiral Thomas H Moorer, USN (Retd), who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1970-74, the articles in this book lead to the following conclusions :

The British Imperial General Staff with its origin in 1909, gradually evolved into a well-organised system, but it is hardly 'Imperial' now, with less and less military coordination with other sovereign Commonwealth partners. However, with growing centralisation under the Chief of Defence Staff, the British war-making capability has vastly improved organisationally and professionally.

The Russian General Staff Organisation passing through various changes under the Tsar and the Soviets has finally developed itself as a highly centralised and efficient decision-making apparatus. It was Marshal Zakharov's tenure as CGS that laid the foundation of the Combined-arms tradition of professionalism, reinforced by greater use of scientific and technological resources as well as managerial techniques. Technocratization also took a formidable

stride in the direction of the Soviet General Staff Academy. But the Russians did not lose sight of the main objective of the Defence efforts, as Lt General V. H. Krulak observed : "It will do us no good to have an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, of whatever quality, if we have forgotten how to wage war." The Top Soviet decision-making body for national security during war or peace has been a small group within the Politbureau which makes the Council of Defence at present, and it is given additional extraordinary powers in time of war. Gosplan plays a major role in resource allocations for national defence, and, to a large extent, operates under the direction of the Council of Defence. While the Main Military Council provides general guide-lines, detailed military planning is done by the General Staff. During the war, the Main Military Council is replaced by *Stavka* (headquarters) of the High Command or of the Supreme High Command, chaired by the C-in-C of the Armed Forces, who would probably be the Party's Chief as well as the Chairman of the Council of Defence. The major strength of the Soviet decision-making lies in its centralization of power. Once a decision is made, it can be implemented swiftly without any prolonged public debate, as in the case of the U. S., or the U. K.

About Soviet concept of military doctrine, Marshal Grechko's following definition is quite comprehensive : "The concept of doctrine . . . encompasses teaching, a scientific or philosophical theory and a system of guiding principles and views. Accordingly, military doctrine is understood to be an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its Armed Forces, on the nature of war and methods for conducting it, and on preparation of the country and army for war. At the very least, military doctrine answers the following basic questions : What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war? What is the nature of the war in which the state and its armed forces will have to take part? What goals and missions would they face in this war? What armed forces are needed to complete the assigned missions and in what direction must military development be carried out? How are the preparations for war to be implemented? What methods must be used to wage war? . . . All of the basic provisions of military doctrine stem from actually existing conditions, and above all, from domestic and foreign policy, the socio-political and economic system, the level of production, the status of means for conducting war, and the geographic position, both of one's own state and that of the probable enemy . . . The theoretical basis of Soviet military doctrine consists of the following :

Marxism-Leninism (incidentally, these are two ideologies that are linked only by a hyphen, since they are really antithetical) : military science; and, to a certain degree, branches of social, natural, and technical sciences related to the preparation of armed struggle, as well as to other forms of struggle—economic, ideological and diplomatic. Military doctrine, in its turn, has a reverse influence on military-theoretical thought”.

Uri Ra'an'an's assumption that Western War-avoidance theories are looked down upon by the Soviets “with contempt, as bourgeois reactionary and unrealistic” is out-moded to-day when the USSR is showing a great interest in peace and disarmament.

In his very interesting essay—*Grinding Axes : Alliance Politics and Decisions in World War II*, J. P. Roche has concluded that both the Allies and the Axis powers during the Second World War hardly created any concept of concerted, rationally planned behaviour. While on 18 December 1940, Hitler set in motion the most spectacular double cross in history with his “Directive No. 21” asking the German Armed Forces to be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa), Japan had not given Berlin advance notice of her intended attack on Pearl Harbour. Roche says that “despite elaborate histories of the coordinating genius of the Chiefs of Staff, fundamental decisions were made far more by improvisation than by plan”.

In *Defence Planning in NATO : A Consensual Decision-making Process*, R. W. Stafford has concluded that NATO consists of sovereign states, its decisions are reached through a slow process of consultation, of consensus building, without any mandatory authority that can compel its members to act quickly in the common interest. Its decision-making process attempts to accommodate the concerns of all and the resultant policy frequently turns out to be the lowest common denominator among conflicting positions. Therefore, he says, NATO is not well suited to deal with new defence requirements.

As regards the US decision-making in national security, while the US President takes decision on the advice of the National Security Council, the execution of NSC's plans is very much dependent on the personal style and wishes of the President whom

it serves. However, by controlling the President's purse, the Congress plays its part in providing new arms and equipment for defence.

The U.S.A. is associated with two types of commands (1) Specified and unified Commands which are U. S.—only operational Commands and (2) Multinational operational Commands, some of which are headed by the same officer who commands one of the U. S.—only commands.

However, inspite of elaborate command arrangements, a failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been observed in meeting the genuine needs of the field commanders in the past, "allowing the Services to acquire command and control systems that do not look at the operational user's web of systems in a fully integrated way."

Governmental agencies including the Congress alone do not decide national security policy in the U.S.A. The media and the private industrialists also contribute their share. How the U. S. media played its role during the Vietnam War in influencing the American public opinion is well known. P. A. Phalon has observed: "To achieve our national goals, U. S. defence industry must be made a more constant participant in the decision-making process."

The following policy recommendations made by the editors may be cited : Decision-making structures have usually been created after, rather than in anticipation of, the problems that must be resolved. Ideally, the decisional structure should be shaped by a clearly stated concept of goals. The problems of formulating goals, developing strategies, providing the necessary means, and creating adequate political structures are formidable in pluralistic societies and alliance systems as a result of the diversity of constituent groups whose interests must be accommodated. Last, but not least, the command structure in peacetime should resemble more fully the system that would exist necessarily in wartime. This may be accomplished in part by the timely use of simulation exercises and by taking steps to enhance the survivability of the command structure under attack. Although the perceived deficiencies in national security policy proposals emanating from the Executive branch in successive Administrations must remain the object of Congressional scrutiny, the inherent inability of Congress to lead or to maintain complete mastery of complex issues and weapons systems must also be recognized. Interdepartmental and interagency committees and

working groups, whatever their inherent deficiencies, will remain principal organizational devices for achieving consensus, consistency, and coordination. Whatever the difficulties, the experience of pluralistic groupings, tested in two World Wars, demonstrates their ability to mobilize vast resources even without elaborate mechanisms for Alliance consultation and policy execution. "In sum, the task confronting the United States remains the development of clearly stated goals strategies, matched by appropriate means. Decisional structures in themselves are clearly no substitute for goals, strategies, and means."

—B. CHAKRAVORTHY

YEARBOOK ON INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1982-83

EDITED BY SATISH KUMAR

Published by Sage Publications, New Delhi 1985, pages 266, price Rs. 250/-

THIS is the first volume in the series of yearbooks providing an ongoing analysis on India's foreign policy from different perspectives. The book is divided into three parts: the first giving a comprehensive review of India's foreign policy concerns in the past, the second dealing with a specific country or region which figured prominently in India's foreign policy formulation, and the third consisting of important documents/excerpts from such documents relating to the subject matter covered in parts I and II. This volume has highlighted the Seventh Non-aligned Summit, SAARC, the new Cold War vis-a-vis India's relations with the two Super powers, and the nuclear crisis. Prefaced by an introductory piece—"*India and the World—A Survey*" by the Editor, the book contains essays on non-alignment and India's relations with the countries in South Asia, South East Asia, West Africa, Southern Africa, Western Europe and the super power.

Besides the book has reproduced twenty-three important foreign policy documents, either fully or in excerpts, covering the period 1978-1983. However, one cannot agree with Satish Kumar's grouping of countries, being contrary to well accepted nomenclature for regions. For example, he has grouped New Zealand and Nauru under South-East Asia, and besides, he has hardly discussed Afghanistan in his essay. Perhaps, his survey would have been meaningful if it could



indicate some future trends in India's foreign policy. Besides the eleven major issues essayed in this book, perhaps another entitled 'India's role in the U.N. during 1982-83' could have been appropriately added.

There is no doubt that this series will be very useful for students of international relations and watchers of India's foreign policy.

—B. CHAKRAVORTHY

#### REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

By S.D. MUNI AND ANURADHA MUNI

Published by National Publishing House, 23 Daryaganj New Delhi-110002, 1984, pages 212, price Rs. 90.00

THE authors of this book have made a thorough study of the theoretical concepts of regional co-operation as being built up in different parts of the globe. Organisations like EEC, COMECON, ASEAN, OECD, RCD, GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council), and U.N. sponsored regional bodies have been discussed in this context. Early attempts at regional co-operation in Asia have also been collated under a table : Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 28, 1947; Conference on Indonesia, New Delhi, January 1949; Baguio Conference, Baguio (Philippines), May 1950; Colombo Plan Conferences in Sydney and London, 1950; Colombo Powers Conference, Colombo, April 1954; Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, April 1955, and Simla Conference, Simla, May 1955.

Although attempts of regional co-operation have always centred round social and economic aspects of the development of the region, because of the incompatibility and seemingly insolubility of the political and security issues, political and security problems between the regional members can hardly be swept under the carpet woven by the texture of socio-economic co-operation. However, in course of a long period of time the rough edges of political problems can be smoothened by efforts at co-operative regional economic ventures so much so that mutual common interests of the regional members may overwhelm the political disputes in favour of real solutions.

The authors have rightly cautioned against the North's veiled manipulation in the regional co-operation organisations. They have



observed : "Any genuine and autonomous attempt to build up regional co-operation in the third world with the aim of achieving collective self-reliance in the developmental process will have to resolve carefully the question of external support in general and that of the North (both North-West and North-East) in particular" Some U.S. scholars have favoured a South Asian system that keeps India 'contained', allowing the United States to play a significant role in this area. The authors have concluded : "South Asian statesmen therefore need to tackle the extra-regional influences coming through economic aid to regional co-operational schemes or through other means, in such a way that desirable and conducive influences are properly harnessed and those with insincere and harmful motives are subtly turned back or made ineffective. Then only South Asian regionalism can evolve as a model of real collective self-reliance. A great deal of diplomatic maturity and sense of unity and purpose will be called for on the part of South Asian countries in pursuing this objective."

They have postulated that unlike the EEC and OECD, success of South Asian Regional Co-operation, with political and security problems prevailing in the region, will not be smooth. But one should not forget that France, England and Germany also fought Two Bitter World Wars between themselves during this century, not to speak of numerous conflicts before, and if they can establish successful regional economic co-operation, why the South Asian peoples will not be able to succeed ?

No doubt this interesting book will be welcomed by all who are interested in the affairs of South Asia. The book contains many official documents relating to South Asian Regional Co-operation, some useful statistical tables, a good bibliography and an Index. A map of the region is wanting.

—B. CHAKRAVORTHY

**ZIA'S PAKISTAN : POLITICS AND STABILITY IN A FRONTLINE STATE**

EDITED : BY CRAIG BAXTER

Published by Westview Press Boulder, Colorado 80301, 1985 pages 122, Price : Not Given.

(West-view Special Studies on South and Southeast Asia)

**THIS** is a collection of papers originally prepared for the Department of State, USA, as part of its external research programme.

In this slim volume, five scholars, specialists in their respective fields, have critically assessed developments in Pakistan during the period 1977-1984, i.e. from the time General Zia-ul-Haq took over control in Pakistan to 1984 when this study was taken up.

The five essays provide material for assessing the prevailing trends in Pakistan's economy, rural and urban public opinion and in general the 'pulse' of Pakistan. This in turn would provide the basis on which to predict, at least in broad outline, the shape of things to come in Pakistan in the near term future. From the standpoint of the editor and coordinator, this would be the period between 1985-90, i.e. roughly the second term of the Reagan era.

This reviewer would like to assess this booklet, which essentially is an unofficial briefing Paper for US State Department and National Security Council specialists, under three heads. First, the data and observations of the five subject specialists; next the political and strategic assessments of the editor, Craig Baxter, regarding Zia's regime at that point of time; and finally, the post 1984 developments in Pakistan.

#### SPECIALISTS' OBSERVATIONS

Robert La Porte's paper on urban groups predictably notes the growing influx of rural population into urban complexes in Pakistan, a feature common to almost all developing countries. In the case of Pakistan, the growing demand for skilled as well as semi and unskilled labour in West Asia was an important factor in sustaining a high rate of influx of rural people into urban complexes. Another equally important factor was the relative agricultural stability achieved first under Ayub Khan and subsequently in the Seventies. Agriculture has been mechanised far more, relatively, than in India, forcing more people to migrate to cities. Yet another is the industrialisation and growth of services and related sectors thanks to consistently large doses of foreign aid. Urbanisation has also resulted in a change in social mores as, for example, betterment of the lot of women although Zia's Islamisation drive has tended to slow down this trend.

The study on rural groups by Charles Kennedy is equally informative and interesting. It notes the political structure of rural areas, by no means uniform throughout Pakistan; Zia's rural policies 1977-1985, or lack of them; and as he himself observes, the government's track record, doubtful rural stability now and future stability

of rural groups. As in all developing countries, the rural sector accounts for 70 to 85 per cent of the population, 80 to 85 in Baluchistan and Sind (excluding the Karachi urban complex), and far less in the Punjab.

The question in Pakistan's academic circles is whether "Pakistan's rural areas should be classified as demonstrating feudalist or capitalist form of production". Feudal land holdings are still large; Ayub reduced these marginally and later Bhutto, the mean size of large farms now being only 10 per cent less than the figure before the promulgation of land reforms. Hence in sum, in rural areas the power of the landed gentry and tribal leaders is even now considerable. This cannot but have its impact on the country's electoral politics.

Important as these are, what will determine Pakistan's future over the longer time frame is its overall economic performance. Obviously natural phenomenon such as adequate and timely rains or drought conditions have their impact on agricultural production and therefore on prices, and foreign exchange costs on account of increased grain imports to mention only a few factors.

The industrial sector is affected by the availability and prices of raw materials, currency fluctuations and increasing costs of labour. Governmental policies too would influence prices and availability of inputs as also export growth. The most important factor affecting Pakistan's economy during the late Seventies and early Eighties however has been the oil price increase and consequent employment opportunities for Pakistanis in West Asia. Remittances from expatriate workers and soldiers averaged about \$ 3 bn a year and served to impart stability to Pakistan's economy. The oil boom and presence of Pakistanis in sizeable numbers in West Asia also helped step up the export of manufactures to the region by as much as 31 per cent a year during 1978-82 enabling the country to further stabilise its economy, and dampen political unrest.

The central issue in Pakistan is the role of the military and the real or imaginary threats to its security. Here, predictably there is a wide range of views. The military has come to stay. Following Zia's jugglery of a referendum, Pakistan has legitimised his position as President while retaining the post of army chief, and has a prime minister answerable to the legislature, on all matter except defence and external affairs.

This suits the United States and its new ally China. Pakistan is nominally a democracy and non-aligned although very much a military dictatorship, with the 'civil administration' in reality being run by the army and not answerable to elected bodies.

Rodney Jones who discusses Pakistan's security perceptions only mentions in passing about Pakistan becoming a nuclear power in the next few years. However, Indian readers ought to remember that CIA has been aware of Pakistan's nuclear progress at least since 1978, as well as of China's transfer of nuclear weapon data and components to its ally. Senator Cranston after his 1984 visit to Pakistan raised the issue of Pakistan's nuclear status in the Senate. Pakistanis generally endorse Zia's role in making Pakistan a nuclear power. They also by and large seem to tolerate Zia's dictatorship, thanks to increased economic opportunities for middle class Pakistanis, whose ranks are swelling by the return of unskilled workers from West Asia with their not inconsiderable savings. Hence by and large Pakistanis have endorsed Zia's continuance in office by not giving him a vote of disapproval.

Two issues, however, could lead to disaffection against the regime. First the pent up long standing grievances of Sindhis and Baluchis against the military and second the unrest caused by Afghan nationals engaged in smuggling, drug peddling and other anti-social activities.

A few facts about Afghan refugees: Western media repeatedly refer to over three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and about one million in Iran. The world has come to accept it, in the absence of readily available authentic information. According to the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Islamabad, a total of 2,865,806 refugees were registered in the 249 refugee camps maintained in Pakistan. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), however, estimates that the actual number is much lower. The WFP (World Food Programme Organisation) places the figure at 1.7 mn and assesses Pakistan's need for food assistance on the basis of total of 1.7 mn refugees. Highly exaggerated numbers of refugees are given by Pakistan for influencing allies and adversaries alike. To government officials in charge of refugee camps, inflated figures mean more doles being available for siphoning off. The individual refugee too has a vested interest in claiming to have more dependents than he has in order to secure extra rations.



A sober estimate is that the number of refugees at no time exceeded 500,000 to 750,000 who to start with left their homes in Afghanistan without knowing what was happening. Many may not be able to return to their homes now because of Pakistan's plans to keep them in Pakistan for use as insurgents of Afghanistan and to strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position vis-a-vis the USA and the Soviet Union.

Craig Baxter has examined all these issues soberly. His objective, judged from the perspectives of an Indian reader, seems to be primarily to assess the possible future of Pakistan and in particular of Zia's regime as of 1984-85, in order to help US policy makers in formulating their own policy for this region.

Had the book been available in India early in 1985, it would have confirmed our suspicions that Pakistan, for its own reasons, is grossly exaggerating the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan; that USA, also for its own reasons endorses Pakistan's actions and that both Pakistan and USA are interested in preventing the return of genuine Afghan refugees to their homes. Unless refugees are held in Pakistan they cannot be forced or induced to foment unrest in Afghanistan.

Additionally if such unrest can be sustained, USA will more easily be able to justify acquiring bases and position its RDF (Rapid Deployment Forces) in Pakistan.

COL RAMA RAO (RETD)

#### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS : 1985

BY JULIAN PERRY ROBINSON

Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford 0×26 DP, 1986, pages 110. Price : Not Given

(SIPRI CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUDIES No. 6)

**M**UCH is to be said for this 5th successive annual review and monograph record of developments in the field of chemical and biological warfare (CBW).

The topics covered are the allegations of treaty-violations made against ten countries during 1985; western moves towards CW rearmament, posture of USSR and efforts made during 1985 to strengthen and extend the existing arms control regime. 1985 was

also the 60th anniversary of the Geneva protocol signed in 1925 by approximately 110 countries. This convention had outlawed the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials and devices. It also outlaws the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. However, there are many areas such as a well defined verification programme which in the absence of sufficient knowledge regarding the capability of USSR or Warsaw Pact alliance countries is difficult to define or implement fully.

It was visualised that by the end of 1985, at least thirty States would possess a CBW capability. As the things stand today, at least 15 States have an offensive CW programme. And whatever has been achieved so far is after nearly 16 years of talks. A notable agreement which deserves attention is the one between USA and USSR to impose a ban on production in CW industry of chemicals (but not all chemicals) in the category that can be used as super-toxic lethal chemical weapons, or precursors of binary weapons. Creation of a CW free zone in Europe or a CW non-proliferation treaty are other proposals under consideration.

American Commanders are today clearly concerned about not having a retaliatory CW capability as stated by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Senate in 1985. Details of this statement and Senate's reaction give an insight into US's thinking on the subject. The Americans clearly see a need for a credible deterrence to Warsaw Pact first use of chemical weapons in Europe. A number of informative charts showing CW activities outlawed or the programmes which have been under progress or for which funding has been sought for in 1986, the present stocks of lethal weapons held by USA, commercial corporations engaged thus far in binary production programmes, different types of chemicals used by USA in Vietnam and other neighbouring countries and the proposed legislation on CW programmes in 1985 provide useful information on the subject.

What has really drawn public attention to a subject about which very little is known even in military circles is the use of Agent Orange, a herbicide used in Vietnam by USA and the increased litigation proceedings filed by the Australians, New Zealanders and American veterans who fought in Indo-China and who are now complaining about the ailments they are suffering from are from over exposure to Agent Orange. This book gives an interesting account of herbicides, insecticides and other irritant agents used in Vietnam.



Besides, Old CW weapons continue to be discovered from battle grounds and even fishermen keep on finding these from ocean beds; Baltic for one is one of the several sea areas which has atleast three such dumping grounds in which 1,50,000 tonnes of CW ammunition have been dumped after world war-II.

In addition, the book includes details of the purported Iraqi CW attack on Iran in March 1985, of allegations concerning the use of CBW weapons in 1983, and the variety of CW arsenal such as toxic chemical shells, spray bombs, yellow rain and artillery delivered incapacitants. The author and the Institute are indeed to be complimented for bringing out this book.

—MAJ GEN Y. K. MADHOK

#### INDIAN ARMY AFTER INDEPENDENCE

By MAJOR K.C. PRAVAL

Published by Lancer International, P.B. No. 3802, New Delhi-110049, 1987, price Rs. 300/-, pages : 623.

THE book under review has been published, after the author's death in October 1984, by his daughter, Ms Vijay Praval. It has been foreworded by Lt Gen S.K. Sinha (Retd), a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army, a good writer on Military subjects. Major Praval's Regimental Histories—*India's Paratroopers : Valour Triumphs* (History of the Kumaon Regiment) and "*The Red Eagles*" (History of the Fourth Division of the Indian Army) have made him well-known as a military historian.

In this extremely readable and informative book, Major Praval has related the story of the Indian Army's growth and expansion, modernisation and challenges since 1947. He has given accounts in some details of all post-Independence operations—the 100-hour war with Hyderabad, the liberation of the Portuguese colonies in India, the India-China limited War, 1962, the Indo-Pak War, 1965, and the Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971—and also the peace-keeping operations in Korea, Congo, Indo-China, Egypt, Lebanon, etc. He has also dealt with the insurgencies in North-Eastern India, Talengana and Punjab, including the Blue Star operation of 1984. Besides the operational aspect of the Indian Army, the author has written on its excellence in extra-martial activities, like sports and games, trekking

and mountaineering, and aid to civil authorities during civil disturbances and natural calamities.

The author has also written an interesting chapter on the Indianization of the Gorkha battalions. He has made thoughtful comments on the regimental system, introduced in 1921, officer-Jawan relationship, class-composition of the regiments, Army-civilian equation, secular and non-regional character of the army, and various national problems, faced both by the civilian and the soldier. He has also supported the idea for the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff or its equivalent for the formulation and execution of defence policy at the national level, as the Chiefs of Staff Committee without a permanent Secretariat or regular meetings, "is merely a notional entity."

The book has no "Bibliography", but it has some good operational sketches and an Index. About two decades ago, there was hardly any interest shown by our Service Officers in writing books on military subjects. However, of late, some military officers have ventured into this field, and a few of them have been able to do justice to their works. Major Praval is in the frontline of those few, and all readers will find his book satisfying and educative.

— B. CHAKRAVORTHY

#### SPACE WEAPONS—THE ARMS CONTROL DILEMMA

EDITED BY : BHUPENDRA JASANI

Published by Taylor and Francis, 4 John street, London WEIN 2 ET, 1984 pages 254 (SIPRI Publications). Price : Not Given

**T**ODAY, satellites have become an essential part of conventional and nuclear military systems and therefore, the inevitable race to protect one's own and to have the ability to damage or destroy those of the adversary's with anti satellite weapons. In turn, the race for anti-satellite weaponry is leading to development of 'hunter killer' satellites, Particle beams and Directed energy weapons. It is stated that USSR has already the ability for anti-satellite orbital weapons while USA is in the process of perfecting its direct ascent capability with a miniature homing vehicle (MHV) capable of being launched from an F-15 aircraft. After launch the MHV will home on to the hostile satellite.

This book from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) gives a gist of papers read by 15 international experts at a Symposium conducted by the Institute in September 1983. The subjects cover a variety of Space Systems as well as BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) both being closely inter-connected, alongwith verification and monitoring measures. They also discuss the risk of a nuclear conflict in an era of unrestrained arms competition in outer space.

For any student of future warfare therefore, this book can easily be treated as a must. From its pages emerge fascinating details about space armoury some of which is in the conceptual stages and this should be of special interest to those countries who have yet to enter the missile age of a nuclear environment. It is considered that in the long run, most of the satellites would provide stability to land based systems, such as those used for command and control purposes as well as for verification, to which both super powers have invariably agreed in their inconclusive space treaties. Another point to note is, that just as Nuclear weapons influenced conventional doctrines, space technology is today influencing the nuclear doctrines and to that extent, we may expect space warfare doctrines.

The erudite and lucid introduction by Bhupendra Jasani deserves special attention. It covers diverse aspects like space targets, anti-satellite and space defence systems, arms control dilemma and final recommendations emphasise the need of working out a comprehensive outer space treaty containing real disarmament measures to ensure greater control over militarisation of space.

This publication should be a welcome addition to any library.

—MAJ GEN V.K. MADHOK

IRAN AND IRAQ : WAR SOCIETY AND POLITICS 1980-1986

SHAHRA CHUBIN & CHARLES

PSIS (PROGRAMME FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES) PAPERS, NUMBER 1/86

Published by Graduate Institute of International Studies, 132, rue de Lausanne-1211 Geneva 21-Switzerland, Pages 59, Price \$ (US) 7.00

THE PSIS Paper No. I/86 is the result of a 2-day workshop held at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, on June 4 and 5, 1986. The principal part of the workshop was devoted to a discussion of the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the two combatant's societies and conversely, the influence that the domestic politics and structure of these states have had on the initiation, conduct and potential termination of the war.

The workshop which was international in composition, considered two papers submitted by the authors. The text of these papers, a summary of the discussion and an introduction comprises the contents of this publication.

The two discussion papers generally cover the following issues :

1. What has been the impact of the war on society ? How has it affected the military and the ruling party ?
2. What has been the role of the minorities in the war ?
3. How have politics affected the conduct of the war ?
4. What are the economic consideration in the war ?
5. What will be the impact of peace on the politics of the country ? What are the principal sources of threat to the regime ?

The above issues have somewhat different relevance to each country but since they were thought to be of sufficient interest and utility they have been presented side by side.

In summing up, the paper contains the view that the war while initiated by Iraq was provoked by Iran which both threatened its neighbours and weakened its own capacity to defend itself (after the Revolution), a classical invitation for war.

On politics and war the following is of interest : "Wars, especially lengthy, costly ones tend, to have major effects on the societies engaged in them. The capabilities of the governments and the demands made on them tend to be different from that of a state of peace. Military institutions tend to assume prominence; different groups are rewarded; practical considerations come into competition with ideological ones; opposition activity tends to diminish or be seen as treason; and the causes and goals of the conflict are interpreted in line with prevalent priorities and constraints.



The ruling party (Ba'th or Islamic Republican) usually seeks to centralise power but at the same time seeks to widen its base of support by signs of flexibility. Domestic opponents, in theory, should be ruthlessly suppressed or won over, and there are signs of this with the Shi'i in Iraq, but not with the Kurds in either country. If the war affects society, the political structure (and more generally the political culture) affects the conduct of hostilities. In neither country is the war prosecuted separately from the ethos of that society; in Iraq, political control is the overriding consideration; in Iran, revolutionary energy is cultivated as a value in itself."

There has been a good deal of material on Iran-Iraq War written primarily with focus on tactics, battles and technical considerations. This paper covers an important dimension of war, a rather interesting aspect, that of the relationship between the war and the unit waging it, i. e. in modern times the nation-state.

—AIR CMDE N. B. SINGH (RETD)

#### ARNHEM SPEARHEAD

BY JAMES SIMS

Imperial War Museum, Lambeth Road, London, SE16HZ. 1978, pages 116, Price £5.75

**M**ANY books have been written about the epic stand of the 1st. British Airborne Division at Arnhem during World War II. Most of these have been written by military historians, who had the benefit of other people's views by interviewing participants and researching the records and documents available in both the German and British archives. Some books have also been written by the participants themselves, either senior commanders or more junior ones, who were privy to the formulation of the battle plans or carrying them out. But 'Arnhem Spearhead' by James Sims is a book quite apart from the normal run of such narratives. It is one of the very rare books to be written by a private soldier, who was at the receiving end of things and had only a 'worm's eye view' of the epic battle.

Maj Gen J D Frost CB, DSO, MC, who was then the Commanding Officer of the Author's Battalion during the Battle, has this to say in his Foreword to the book :—

"This is the first book that I have read, which was written by one of the soldiers who trained for and fought at the Battle of Arnhem Bridge in September 1944. It is a most vivid moving personal account which should be of great interest to all kinds of people, for there are few such written by young soldiers about the last war or any other war for that matter"

Here for the first time is the story of that disastrous but heroic engagement or rather of its vertex—the struggle for the bridge—as seen through the eyes of a private soldier.

After volunteering for the Parachute Regiment and successfully completing the rigorous training necessary to qualify for admission to this corps d'elite, James Sims in Sep '44, at the age of nineteen, found himself a participant in the greatest airborne assault in the history of airborne warfare—Operation Market Garden. It was a daring airborne and ground offensive designed to blast a 'back-door' route through Holland into the industrial heartland of Germany. His unit, 2nd Bn The Parachute Regt, formed part of the vanguard of the formidable British 1st Airborne Division and had the task of capturing the main objective—the road bridge over the River Rhine at Arnhem.

In the first part of his book Private Sims gives some frank views of the training he received first at Larkhill with the Royal Artillery and later with the Parachute Regiment. At Larkhill he appears to have found a surprising amount of 'bull' and he felt that if you had any spirit at all they seemed determined to break it. Their attitude has been summed up as :—

"If it moves-salute it !

If it stands still-blanco it !

If it is too heavy to lift-paint it !

He finally joined the Parachute Regt as he—"wanted to be able to look after himself in action and not be nurse-maid to a bloody great gun". But ironically, as often happens in the Army, in the Parachute Battalion he ended up in the mortar platoon more or less in the same predicament.

The wartime training in the Parachute Regiment turned out, however, to be more rational and task-oriented. Even its discipline,



as outlined in a pamphlet called "Discipline the only road to Victory" prepared by Gen 'Boy' Browning, GOC Airborne Forces, and issued to all ranks joining these elite forces, created a profound and lasting impression on young Sims and his companions. His description of parachuting in those early days is both realistic and very interesting as also of the hard training that accompanied it.

In the second part of the book the author describes in simple, terse and vivid prose the fighting around him producing a most gripping narrative, which is better than any thriller. Gen Frost says—"He describes so well the atmosphere in the cellars, where the wounded lay and tells us of the devotion of the 'medics', both in bringing the wounded in and mitigating their suffering thereafter". He paints an unforgettable picture of the selfless courage, brave defiance and grim humour of his comrades as, powerless to defend themselves against the German armour, and with only a few rounds of ammunition left, they waited for the end in an inferno of fumes, dust and falling masonry.

The last two chapters give a remarkable account of his experiences as a prisoner of war in Germany during the final chaotic months of the Third Reich. He brings out clearly how good NCOs, who were able to maintain good discipline under the most adverse circumstances, helped to create order out of chaos, brought back to the prisoners their self-respect and thus aided them to face upto all the difficulties and in the end survive.

There are undoubtedly, as Gen Frost points out, some errors of detail. These minor inaccuracies add to rather than detract from the authenticity of the book, since they show that the author has relied on his own impressions and experiences and has not adulterated his narrative by bringing it into line with other sources.

This book may not be compulsory reading for those wishing to study this campaign for Staff College entrance examinations, but it is certainly a must for all regimental officers wishing to get a feel of the realistic atmosphere of this epic battle.

—MAJ GEN S. C. SINHA (RETD)

## THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973 :

EDITED BY CARL BERGER

Revised Edition Published by Office of Air Force History

United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. 1984

Pages 383, Price \$ 14.00

THE United States' military involvement in Southeast Asian conflict has been described as the longest, most controversial and financially most costly war in the U.S. history. This revised edition of the book is a single-volume history of air activity in this long-drawn out war in which the United States Air Force operations served primarily to assist troops on the ground. The USAF flew hundred of thousands of missions for close air support, interdiction, airlift, and battlefield illumination inside South Vietnam. It also developed and perfected reconnaissance aircraft and surveillance equipment to see through the enemy's cover, and gunships to hinder his combat effectiveness. The entire spectrum of air activities in Southeast Asia has been realistically described by thirteen contributors to the volume who possessed expert knowledge of specific aspects of the war, acquired through personal participation in it or years of research and writing on the subject.

The volume which contains more than 600 combat pictures, most of them in colour, does not claim to be a comprehensive and analytical one-volume history, but its value lies in depicting the complexities of the air war. The pictures provide a realistic sense of continuously unfolding drama of a difficult war from the air force point of view because of its various restrictions and frustrations arising from constraints that could only appear unreasonable to airmen-frustrations from stringent rules of engagement which tended to offset advantages in skill and technology.

The contents of the book include air operations in South Vietnam, 1962-1964, Air war against North Vietnam, air operations over Northern Laos, air war in Cambodia, B-52 operations, tactical and strategic airlift, air refuelling and tactical reconnaissance. The role of support services has been described in separate chapters on air rescue, logistics, base defence, medical support and military-civic action.

The book is bound in hard cover in air force blue colour, with 383 pages of fine art paper on which the coloured pictures of combat aircraft in air operations in Vietnam present a vivid documentary evidence of the written text which is brief but factual. The book describes the reaction of the North Vietnamese to the 11 day bombing campaign in 1972 nicknamed Operation Linebacker II, which resulted in one of the heaviest aerial assaults of the war as follows :

"The North Vietnamese responded by launching most of their inventory of about 1,000 SAM'S and opening up a heavy barrage of AAA fire against the attackers, but the USAF electronic counter-measures helped to keep the losses to a minimum. Of 27 aircraft lost, 15 were B-52's which were downed by SAMs. Three others were badly damaged. However by 28 December the enemy defences had been all but obliterated and during the last two days of the campaign, the B-52's flew over Hanoi and Haiphong without suffering any damage. Deprived of their airbases North Vietnamese pilots were able to launch only 32 aircraft of which 8 were shot down, 2 by B-52 tail gunners."

The book is an excellent effort to describe and illustrate the air activities of the USAF during the War in Southeast Asia. It should help in broader understanding of the role played by the air force in the Vietnam War.

—AIR CDE N. B. SINGH (RETD)

THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY : A HISTORY FROM THE 1840s TO THE 1980s,

COMPILED BY MAJOR M.R. WICKSTEED, RNZA

Army Public Relations Officer, Wellington, July 1982; pages 101;  
price : not mentioned

THE army of New Zealand had its genesis in the formation of militia forces in the 1840s in the wake of Maori Chief Hone Heke's raids of 1844. During the years 1840-1844, New Zealand's military forces comprised only some small detachments of Imperial troops. The first Militia Ordinance was passed by New Zealand's Legislative Council on 25 March 1845. After the Militia Act was passed in mid-1858 by the New Zealand Parliament, which had first met in 1854, the country was divided into militia districts and a

permanent training staff was provided for each district. In 1864, the Government proposed its 'self-reliant' policy to build national forces and dispense with Imperial troops. The last British regiment left the country by 1870. Consequently, the first regular force—a body of about 500 mounted troops—was raised on voluntary basis after the Colonial Defence Act was passed in 1862, and simultaneously, special forces, known as 'Bush Rangers' and 'Forest Rangers' were also created. By end 1867, when the Maori trouble was almost over, both the Colonial Defence Force and the Special forces were disbanded. The Armed Constabulary Act of 1867 created the Armed Constabulary which combined military with police duties. During the Anglo-Maori Wars of 1843-47 and 1860-72, about 562 British and Colonial troops died and 1050 were wounded. Approximately 250 'friendly' and 2000 'hostile' Maoris were killed during these operations.

The Volunteers, created by the Militia Act of 1854, however, continued till 1909. Under the Defence Act of 1909, the Volunteer force was replaced by Territorials. During the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, New Zealand sent 6495 Volunteers and 8000 horses to South Africa, and these forces were brigaded with other forces, instead of being employed operationally as a national entity. Fighting under General Robert and General Kitchener, they were "by general consent, regarded on the average the best mounted troops in South Africa". New Zealand's casualties were 288 dead and 166 wounded.

In 1909, the Territorial Force of 30,000 men was created on the basis of compulsory recruitment, and two years later, the New Zealand Staff Corps was formed, leading to increased efficiency. During the First World War, New Zealand's expeditionary force of 8427 volunteers from the Territorial Force and 3815 horse under the command of Major-General Godley fought in Egypt, Gallipoli, Sinai-Palestine and France with glory. Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby wrote of them: "nothing daunted these intrepid fighters: to them nothing was impossible". Field Marshal Earl Haig said: "...no division in France built up for itself a finer reputation, whether for gallantry of its conduct in battle or for excellence of its behaviour out of the line". In this War "1,00,444 troops left New Zealand for service with the expeditionary forces: of these, 16,697 lost their lives and 41,317 were wounded—a staggering and appalling 58 percent casualty rate".



In 1931, the Government of New Zealand suspended the compulsory clause of the Defence Act and reduced the strength of the Territorial Force from 17,000 to 3700 and the Regular Force to less than 600. "However, in 1939 New Zealand was less ready for an impending war than she had been in 1914. The Regular Force numbered only 578, the Territorial Force 10,364 and the Special Reserve 374." During the Second World War, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) of 1,04,988 men and women served overseas in the Middle East, Italy and the Pacific. Even the Maori-28 (Maori) Battalion—participated in this War. New Zealand's total casualties were 6,839 killed and 16,543 wounded. New Zealand's troops later formed part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan during 1945-48.

The important post-War development was the passing of the Army Act of 1950 which combined the regular and territorial forces to form "The New Zealand Army". The forces of New Zealand served in the Korean War, 1950-54, the Malayan Emergency, 1955-60, Vietnam War, 1964-72, and in Rhodesia in 1980.

Overall, New Zealand's armed forces made a name wherever they went. Starting as mounted, ill-equipped militia they gradually became an up-to-date army, well-trained and well-equipped to defend their country against possible aggressors.

The book has traced the history of the New Zealand Army from the 1840s to 1980s. However, it has not discussed how ANZUS has politically influenced the country's defence policy and posture and how lately the Government of the country is trying to follow a somewhat independent policy vis-a-vis aggressive U.S. nuclear policy. The publication contains beautiful photographs, depicting various scenes throughout the 140-year history, and also some operational maps.

—B. CHAKRAVORTY

**MONTGOMERY AND GUDERIAN : A STUDY IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP**

BY MAJOR R.K. BHONSLE

Published by Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1986 pp 356, Rs. 40.00

**I**N Montgomery and Guderian—a study in military leadership, Bhonsle endeavours to analyse the leadership traits and command

abilities of two world war II heroes that is Bernard Law Montgomery and Heinz Guderian, a British and a German respectively and link them to the present concept of Science and leadership. The author has picked out those facets of strategic inspiration, leadership, morale, tactics and administration which can be applied in a conventional non-nuclear environment in our context. They were contemporary, were commissioned in their armies before first world war, their career encompass the two world wars and they participated actively in the second world war. This book is a concise and yet complete study of the campaigns in which they played a major role. The emphasis is on military leadership and only those political decisions as they affected military operations are mentioned.

The book will be of interest to the students of military history, service officers and other readers who want to know about world war II and the two commanders. The book is illustrated with maps, the important events in the life of two commanders and code names of operations are given. Some objective type of questions are included, which will be of help to service officers in their promotion examinations.

—P.C. BANSAL

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
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# U S I

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